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THE NEED FOR NON-DISCRETIONARY
INTERLOCUTORY APPELLATE REVIEW IN
MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION
Andrew S. Pollis*
Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) is a tool for managing complex litigation
by transferring cases with common questions of fact to a single judge for
coordinated pretrial proceedings. The subject matter of the cases can run
the gamut from airplane crashes to securities fraud to environmental
disasters, such as the recent BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. Today,
about a third of all pending civil cases in federal court are part of the MDL
system. A single judge renders all the important legal decisions in each
MDL, exerting outsized impact on the parties and on the evolution of the
law—and does so with virtually no scrutiny from other judges. This power
centralization promotes efficient case management, but it can be an
anathema to our conception of decentralized justice. One instance of
unreviewable pretrial error can have immediate and sweeping impact on
thousands of cases in one fell swoop.
It is time to restore the balance of judicial power. This Article argues for
an expansion of non-discretionary interlocutory appellate jurisdiction over
certain legal rulings rendered in MDL cases.
Any opportunity to appeal before the end of the case reflects an inherent
value judgment that the immediate rights at stake outweigh the burdens that
interlocutory review imposes on the courts. The discretionary approach to
interlocutory appellate jurisdiction has proven generally adequate. But it is
not adequate in the context of MDL proceedings, where the risks and
consequences of legal error are heightened considerably. Ultimately, MDL
cases tend to settle rather than proceed to final judgment, so the appellate
courts rarely have an opportunity to clarify the law, and the settlements are
often mispriced as a result of the uncertainty. The absence of appellate
review also deprives our jurisprudence of one of its central features—the
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back-and-forth negotiation of legal principles that occurs when multiple
jurists grapple with the same legal questions.
Certain interlocutory MDL orders, then, warrant mandatory appellate
jurisdiction. To qualify, the order should involve a pure issue of law in an
unsettled area or in contravention of established precedent, and immediate
appellate review should potentially be dispositive of a significant number of
cases in the MDL. The guaranteed availability of immediate review in
these circumstances would not come without costs, but the benefits would
far outweigh them. Indeed, the right of immediate appeal would ensure the
integrity of the MDL process on which our legal system has come so heavily
to depend.
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INTRODUCTION
Excessive power, whether in the hands of an evil dictator or a benevolent
judge, should make us nervous. Our nervousness should grow in proportion
to the number of persons subject to that power. It should also grow when
there is no meaningful check on that power.
The federal statute authorizing multidistrict litigation (MDL) effectively
vests that sort of outsized, unreviewable power in federal district judges.
The MDL system creates the sort of “kingly power” in trial judges that the
U.S. Congress has historically found repugnant 1—the sort of power that
Congress has taken steps to “overthrow” by expanding appellate
jurisdiction. 2 But there is no appellate jurisdiction over most interlocutory
MDL orders. And that should make us nervous.
Modern litigation has demanded creative case-aggregation and judicialmanagement tools. The MDL is one of those tools. Propelled in large
measure by the rise of the mass tort, the MDL system aggregates separately
filed federal actions that involve “one or more common questions of fact.”3
The actions, wherever filed, are transferred to a single judge who holds the
power to make every pretrial ruling in all of them. 4 The actions
1. See 21 CONG. REC. 3404 (1890) (statement of Rep. David Culberson) (legislative
history of Circuit Court of Appeals (Evarts) Act, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891)).
2. See id.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2006).
4. E.g., Mark Moller, The Rule of Law Problem: Unconstitutional Class Actions and
Options for Reform, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 855, 881 (2005); see also Douglas
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consolidated in an MDL proceeding can number in the thousands. 5 A
single judge, for example, will handle hundreds of federal actions arising
out of the 2010 BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. 6
Consolidation of power in a single federal judge offers advantages in
terms of uniformity, efficiency, and the facilitation of global settlement.7
But it also ratchets up considerably the risk and consequences of legal error,
particularly when the MDL raises issues of first impression. A single
judge’s thinking exerts a disproportionate influence on the evolution of the
law. 8 New legal theories emerge, unrefined by the scrutiny of other trialcourt judges wrestling with the same problems. And, because interlocutory
rulings generally are not subject to immediate appeal, the trial judge
presiding over an MDL lacks any meaningful appellate supervision.9 For
the sake of gaining control over case management, the existing MDL
format sacrifices a critical component of law management. The power
consolidation also leaves litigants, unable to take an immediate appeal, with
a Hobson’s choice: (a) risk a highly unfavorable trial verdict that may
result from the judge’s mistaken view of the law, with the hope of securing
relief on a post-trial appeal; or (b) avoid the risk by settling before trial—
but at a price that reflects the erroneous legal rulings. 10
It is unclear whether Congress lacked the foresight to anticipate these
problems when it passed the Multidistrict Litigation Act 11 in 1968 or
whether it consciously determined that the anticipated benefits of so
structuring the MDL system outweighed these costs. Either way, it failed to
appreciate the value of building into the MDL process a right, under limited
circumstances, to appeal immediately from significant pretrial rulings in
MDLs. Early appellate scrutiny would serve as a much-needed antidote to
the excess power the current MDL system bestows on the individual
presiding judge. And it would replace the Hobson’s choice with an
opportunity for real, systematic dispensation of justice while leaving the
parties free to settle without appeal if that is their preference.
McCollam, Slick on Slick, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 7, 2010, at 44, 62 (noting that a
multidistrict litigation (MDL) judge “customarily exercises a lot of sway”).
5. See, e.g., In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d 201, 206 (3d Cir. 2006) (describing MDL involving
“14,000 actions filed by some 30,000 to 35,000 plaintiffs”).
6. See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon,” MDL No. 2179, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 83268 (J.P.M.L. Aug. 10, 2010); see also In re BP p.l.c. Sec. Litig., MDL
No. 2185, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83263, at *4 (J.P.M.L. Aug. 10, 2010) (consolidating
under single judge all federal actions involving allegations that BP misled investors about its
safety measures).
7. Edward F. Sherman, The MDL Model for Resolving Complex Litigation If a Class
Action Is Not Possible, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2205, 2223 (2008); see also Danielle Oakley, Note,
Is Multidistrict Litigation a Just and Efficient Consolidation Technique? Using Diet Drug
Litigation As a Model To Answer This Question, 6 NEV. L.J. 494, 506 (2005).
8. See Moller, supra note 4, at 857.
9. Cf. Melissa A. Waters, Common Law Courts in an Age of Equity Procedure:
Redefining Appellate Review for the Mass Tort Era, 80 N.C. L. REV. 527, 530 (2002).
10. E.g., Michael J. Davidson, A Modest Proposal: Permit Interlocutory Appeals of
Summary Judgment Denials, 147 MIL. L. REV. 145, 205 (1995).
11. See Multidistrict Litigation Act, Pub. L. No. 90-296, 82 Stat. 109 (1968) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006)).
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As I explain in Part I, the hodgepodge avenues of interlocutory appellate
jurisdiction fall into two basic categories: mandatory jurisdiction and
discretionary jurisdiction. Every right of interlocutory appeal reflects a
value judgment that the immediate vindication of a particular right justifies
early involvement of an appellate court, at the expense of judicial economy
and trial-court autonomy.
The difference between mandatory and
discretionary jurisdiction is in essence one of allocating the task of making
that value judgment. Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court have
sometimes made the judgments categorically, establishing mandatory
appellate jurisdiction over certain kinds of interlocutory orders that always
have a “serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence.”12 But in large measure
the opportunity for interlocutory review is left to the lower courts to provide
or to decline, based on subjective case-by-case determinations. We can
frame the distinction as one of rules (mandatory jurisdiction) versus
standards (discretionary jurisdiction) 13 or as another example of the debate
over institutional choice (“deciding who decides”). 14 However scrutinized,
the end result is that our current system vests trial and appellate courts with
broad and misplaced discretion to deny interlocutory review over important
orders in MDLs. The existing scholarship has not offered an adequate
solution; commentators have frequently criticized rules of appellate
jurisdiction 15 and have advocated for expanding the scope of discretionary
But tinkering with discretionary review is
interlocutory review. 16
inadequate in the MDL context. Litigants in MDLs should enjoy a right of
interlocutory appellate review when the trial court steps outside the
parameters of settled law and when the decision in question has widespread
impact on MDL litigants.17
Part II shows how the absence of guaranteed appellate review over MDL
cases has increasingly significant consequences. The proportion of suits
12. Balt. Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 181 (1955).
13. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE
L.J. 557, 559–60 (1992) (“[A] rule may entail an advance determination of what conduct is
permissible, leaving only factual issues for the adjudicator . . . . A standard may entail
leaving both specification of what conduct is permissible and factual issues for the
adjudicator.”); see also Scott Dodson, The Complexity of Jurisdictional Clarity, 97 VA. L.
REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2011) (manuscript at 17–25), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1673116 (discussing distinction between rules and standards and analogizing it to distinction
between mandates and discretion).
14. See, e.g., NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 3 (1994).
15. Adam N. Steinman, Reinventing Appellate Jurisdiction, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1237, 1294
(2007); see also Thomas E. Baker, An Annotated Bibliography on Federal Appellate
Practice and Procedure, 10 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 13 (2009) (listing numerous articles on
appellate jurisdiction and related issues).
16. See infra notes 101–13 and accompanying text.
17. Only one prior commentator, Professor Timothy P. Glynn, has advocated the
expansion of mandatory appellate jurisdiction over trial court decisions in what he
characterizes as “problem areas.” Timothy P. Glynn, Discontent and Indiscretion:
Discretionary Review of Interlocutory Orders, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 175, 259 (2001).
But Professor Glynn makes no mention of the MDL system and declines to identify any
specific problem areas to which his analysis would apply. Id. at 261–62; see also infra text
accompanying notes 115–22.
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consolidated in MDLs has grown considerably since Congress first
authorized MDLs in 1968. In recent years, up to one-third of all civil
lawsuits pending in the federal courts have been consolidated in MDLs. A
single trial-court decision can implicate hundreds, or even thousands, of
individual lawsuits. As a result, MDL decisions can have an exaggerated
influence both for the parties to MDL proceedings and for the evolution of
the law. The existing rules of appellate jurisdiction rarely permit immediate
appellate review of most significant MDL decisions; the decisions in
question do not fit the traditional mold of orders reviewable as of right, and
discretionary review in this context is unreliable. To illustrate the
untenability of the status quo, I look closely at some of the more
controversial decisions rendered in a high-profile product-liability MDL
involving a gasoline additive—decisions that, to date, have evaded
appellate review.18
Building on my analysis in Parts I and II, I propose in Part III a right of
immediate appellate review in MDLs from interlocutory orders that raise
important issues of unsettled law (or departures from settled law) and that
are potentially dispositive of a significant number of the consolidated cases.
My proposed test would essentially convert an existing discretionary right
of appeal in the ordinary case into a mandatory right of appeal if the case is
part of an MDL proceeding. The reform would provide a much-needed and
meaningful check on MDL judges. It also would create a foundation for
global settlement based not on the coercion of a single trial judge’s
potentially erroneous view of the law, but instead on carefully considered
legal principles that have been forged in the course of full-scale appellate
review. While the greater access to appellate review would not come
without costs, the benefits for the litigants, for both the evolution of the law
and the public’s confidence in the judicial system would far outweigh them.
I. MANDATORY AND DISCRETIONARY APPELLATE JURISDICTION:
DELINEATING WHO MAKES THE VALUE JUDGMENTS
A. Access to the Appellate Courts As an Expression of Value Judgments
The right to appeal in American jurisprudence is “sacrosanct,” and “we
clutch it reverently to our collective breast.”19 In federal civil cases, the
right, born with the Judiciary Act of 1789, 20 is credited with enhancing the
federal courts’ “ability to administer justice in a regular, evenhanded, and
confidence-inspiring manner.” 21 That public confidence results from a

18. In the interest of full disclosure, I also note that I served as counsel for one of the
principal defendants in the referenced MDL and attempted, unsuccessfully, to obtain
interlocutory appellate review of some of the decisions I describe below.
19. Harlon Leigh Dalton, Taking the Right To Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 YALE
L.J. 62, 62, 64 (1985). Professor Dalton questions the desirability of appeals of right
generally and proposes that they be limited to certain categories of cases. See id. at 97–107.
20. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 22, 1 Stat. 73, 84.
21. Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Reconsidering the Frankfurterian Paradigm: Reflections on
Histories of Lower Federal Courts, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 679, 712 (1999).
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blend of what Professor Cassandra Burke Robertson identifies as “three of
the basic goals of appellate review—(1) increasing the probability of a
correct judgment; (2) providing uniformity of result; and (3) increasing
litigants’ sense that their dispute has been fully and fairly heard.”22
But the right is not, and cannot be, unrestricted. The opportunity for
appellate review cannot be so broad that it imposes “unmanageable burdens
on the judicial system” by permitting unlimited rights to appeal
interlocutory orders. 23 Interlocutory appeals burden the appellate courts
and slow down the resolution of cases in the trial courts. 24 The extreme
example proves the point: “If parties could take up on appeal each disputed
ruling by a lower court as it was handed down, the case could drag on
indefinitely.” 25
Thus, every decision to allow an interlocutory appeal necessarily reflects
a subjective value judgment that the interests of the aggrieved party in the
prompt resolution of a particular claim of error outweigh the systemic
interests that militate in favor of requiring that party to wait until the end of
the case to seek appellate vindication. By definition, then, permitting
interlocutory appellate review involves a balancing test of competing policy
choices. 26 The struggle to strike the proper balance is evident in the
application of the most fundamental rule of appellate jurisdiction, the finaljudgment rule. Codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1291, 27 the final-judgment rule
supposedly restricts appellate jurisdiction to “final” decisions that “end[]
the litigation on the merits and leave[] nothing for the court to do but
execute the judgment.” 28 But finality itself is in the eyes of the beholder;
Justice Hugo Black observed that the Court’s decisions “dealing with the
meaning of finality have provided no satisfactory definition of this term.”29
22. Cassandra Burke Robertson, Appellate Review of Discovery Orders in Federal
Court: A Suggested Approach for Handling Privilege Claims, 81 WASH. L REV. 733, 771
(2006); see also Dalton, supra note 19, at 69 (“[A]ppellate courts exist to correct errors; to
develop legal principles; and to tie geographically dispersed lower courts into a unified,
authoritative legal system.”).
23. Robertson, supra note 22, at 771.
24. See, e.g., id. at 738.
25. Martin H. Redish, The Pragmatic Approach to Appealability in the Federal Courts,
75 COLUM. L. REV. 89, 89 (1975); see also Glynn, supra note 17, at 222 (appellate review
normally “should wait until the end of the litigation in the district court”).
26. Robert J. Martineau, Defining Finality and Appealability by Court Rule: Right
Problem, Wrong Solution, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 717, 767 (1993) (“[A]n appeal [should] be
permitted from an admittedly interlocutory order, when the dangers of allowing an
interlocutory appeal are outweighed by the advantages of allowing the appeal.”).
27. The statute provides, in pertinent part: “The courts of appeals . . . shall have
jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States . . . .”
28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006) (emphasis added).
28. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945).
29. Rederi A/B Disa v. Cunard S.S. Co., 389 U.S. 852, 854 (1967) (Black, J.,
dissenting), denying cert. to 376 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1967); see also McGourkey v. Toledo &
Ohio Cent. Ry. Co., 146 U.S. 536, 544–45 (1892) (“Probably no question of equity practice
has been the subject of more frequent discussion in this court than the finality of decrees.”);
Maurice Rosenberg, Solving the Federal Finality-Appealability Problem, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer 1984, at 170, 171 (“The idea that an appeal to the second level of a court
system should wait until a final decision has issued at the first level of the system is as sweet
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The Court has also noted that “[n]o verbal formula yet devised can explain
prior finality decisions with unerring accuracy or provide an utterly reliable
guide for the future.” 30 The guiding principle has nevertheless remained
the same: to balance “the most important competing considerations,” which
“are ‘the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review on the one hand and
the danger of denying justice by delay on the other.’” 31
Grappling with these competing considerations, Congress and the Court
have frequently “hedged the finality requirement with exceptions and
qualifications necessitated by shared perceptions that there are times when
forthright application of a simple rule against piecemeal appeals works
injustice and diseconomy.” 32 We recognize that an opportunity to appeal
from a nonfinal order sometimes “would prevent irreparable harm to a
party, advance the termination of the litigation, or serve some broader
public interest, [so] there have been constant efforts to make exceptions to
the finality requirement to allow early appeals in some cases.”33
But every argument for expanding appellate rights is met with forceful
opposition by those keen to limit the exceptions, on the theory that
permitting “piecemeal, prejudgment appeals . . . undermines ‘efficient
judicial administration’ and encroaches upon the prerogatives of district
court judges, who play a ‘special role’ in managing ongoing litigation.”34
Several Supreme Court Justices have thus expressed hostility toward the
expansion of appellate rights; Justice Breyer has “cautioned against
expanding the class of orders eligible for interlocutory appeal.” 35 Justice
Scalia has observed that “finality jurisprudence is sorely in need of further
limiting principles.” 36 And the Court has repeatedly emphasized that
and simple as a baby’s kiss. But as so often happens with legal affairs that are simple in
theory the finality requirement in actual operation becomes ‘dazzling in its
complexity’ . . . .” (quoting Edward H. Cooper, Timing As Jurisdiction: Federal Civil
Appeals in Context, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1984, at 156, 156)).
30. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170 (1974).
31. Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152–53 (1964) (quoting Dickinson v.
Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950)); see also Eisen, 417 U.S. at 171.
Perhaps the Court’s most vexing application of the final-judgment rule is the collateral-order
doctrine. See infra notes 44–50 and accompanying text.
32. Paul D. Carrington, Toward a Federal Civil Interlocutory Appeals Act, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1984, at 165, 165; see also Redish, supra note 25, at 90 (“[T]he
final judgment rule and its preexisting exceptions have not always been sufficient to assure
fairness to appellants.”).
33. Martineau, supra note 26, at 788; see also Pierre H. Bergeron, District Courts As
Gatekeepers? A New Vision of Appellate Jurisdiction over Orders Compelling Arbitration,
51 EMORY L.J. 1365, 1369 (2002) (“[I]nterlocutory review is largely unavailable in a
significant number of cases in which it should be appropriate.”); Robertson, supra note 22, at
741 (“[T]he detriments [of the final-judgment rule] generally outweigh the benefits.”);
Michael E. Solimine, Revitalizing Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts, 58 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1165, 1165 (1990) (“[I]nterlocutory appeals can and should play a greater
role in the adjudicative process in the federal courts.”).
34. Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 605 (2009) (quoting Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981)).
35. Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 320 (1996) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
36. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 292 (1988) (Scalia,
J., concurring).
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exceptions to the final-judgment rule are confined to those situations in
which strict adherence to it “‘would practically defeat the right to any
review at all.’” 37
The back-and-forth debate has given rise to a vast body of literature,
populated by both courts and commentators, striving “to determine how to
strike the balance” 38 between “allowing meaningful interlocutory review
when necessary” and avoiding “overburdening the federal appellate system
with a cascade of interlocutory appeals.” 39 The debate is not new; more
than sixty years ago, the Supreme Court noted that “the volume of judicial
writing” on the subject was “formidable.” 40 And the struggle to construe
and apply doctrines of appellate jurisdiction continues right up to the
present day. 41
Certainly, then, there is a fundamental question over where to draw the
line. Congress, courts, and commentators have all struggled to strike the
proper balance in conferring adequate opportunities to appeal without
overburdening the judicial system or inhibiting the expeditious progression
of cases through the trial courts. But there is just as fundamental a question
about who should draw the line. And, as I explain below in Part I.B,
Congress and the Supreme Court have ultimately answered that question in
two different ways. The first way, expressed in routes of interlocutory
appeal of right, reflects Congress’s or the Court’s own determination that a
particular category of trial-court orders always justifies immediate review
and therefore warrants a fixed rule. The second way, discretionary
interlocutory appeal, reflects a decision to delegate to the lower courts the
task, on a case-by-case basis, of making the value judgments and
conducting the balancing tests according to flexible standards.
The dual system has spawned a labyrinthian conglomeration of
jurisdictional rules—a “crazy quilt,” as one student commentator has
described it 42—and commentators frequently criticize the resulting
confusion.
Confusion aside, I show below in Part I.C that the
commentators who have advocated expanding appellate jurisdiction have
37. Mohawk, 130 S. Ct. at 610 (Thomas, J., concurring in part) (quoting Cobbledick v.
United States, 309 U.S. 323, 324–25 (1940)).
38. See Redish, supra note 25, at 100.
39. Bergeron, supra note 33, at 1367; see also Glynn, supra note 17, at 176 (“The
vexing question is how to distinguish those interlocutory orders that are worthy of immediate
review from those that are not.”); Martineau, supra note 26, at 767 (“[T]he interests of the
parties in a speedy, fair, just, and effective review of their cases should be weighed against
the interest in preventing piecemeal appeals.”); Redish, supra note 25, at 100 (“The difficult
issue is, of course, to determine how to strike the balance in each case.”).
40. Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 508 (1950); see also id. at
516–17 (Black, J., dissenting) (“Finality and appealability have provided judges, lawyers,
and commentators with a perpetual subject for debate.”).
41. See Ortiz v. Jordan, No. 09-737, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 915, at *7 (Jan. 24, 2011) (recent
decision holding that a party may not “appeal an order denying summary judgment after a
full trial on the merits”).
42. John C. Nagel, Note, Replacing the Crazy Quilt of Interlocutory Appeals
Jurisprudence with Discretionary Review, 44 DUKE L.J. 200, 200 (1994); see also Steinman,
supra note 15, at 1238–39 (collecting numerous pejorative phrases commentators have used
to describe the intricacies of federal appellate jurisdiction).
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focused largely on the discretionary, case-by-case route, rather than
recognizing a need for categorically expanding rights of mandatory review
in appropriate circumstances.
B. The Existing Avenues of Interlocutory Appellate Jurisdiction—
Mandatory and Discretionary
1. Mandatory Interlocutory Appellate Jurisdiction, Whereby the Supreme
Court or Congress Has Made Categorical Value Judgments
The Supreme Court and Congress have sometimes carved out exceptions
to the final-judgment rule by providing mandatory appellate jurisdiction
over certain types of interlocutory orders. In these circumstances, the Court
or Congress itself has made the value judgment categorically, leaving no
discretion to the lower courts to decline appellate jurisdiction if a trial
court’s order fits within particular parameters.
The Court’s primary contribution was the 1949 creation of the collateralorder doctrine, 43 which permits appeals from orders that “are ‘collateral to’
the merits of an action and ‘too important’ to be denied immediate
review.” 44 The Court has actually avoided characterizing the collateralorder doctrine as a route of interlocutory appeal and instead has emphasized
that the orders in question are deemed “final,” 45 but a collateral order does
not actually end the action, as a final order normally does. As a result, the
collateral-order rule has spawned criticism from both within the Court 46 and
from commentators. 47 For present purposes, the important features of the
collateral-order doctrine are the value judgments inherently reflected in its
contours.
To illustrate: the Court has held that an order denying a defendant’s
motion to dismiss on the basis of immunity meets the collateral-order test,
because immunity “is both a defense to liability and a limited ‘entitlement

43. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
44. E.g., Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 603 (2009) (quoting Cohen,
337 U.S. at 546).
45. See, e.g., Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349 (2006) (collateral-order doctrine is
“‘best understood not as an exception to the “final decision” rule laid down by Congress in
[28 U.S.C.] § 1291, but as a “practical construction” of it’” (quoting Digital Equip. Corp. v.
Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867 (1994))).
46. Justice Thomas, concurring in the 2009 decision that rejected application of the
collateral-order doctrine to orders compelling the production of privileged information,
suggested that mere consideration of the collateral-order doctrine in such circumstances
“perpetuates a judicial policy that we for many years have criticized and struggled to limit.”
Mohawk, 130 S. Ct. at 610 (Thomas, J., concurring in part). Justice Scalia, joined by
Justices Thomas and O’Connor, chastised the Court for having “invented” the collateralorder doctrine, for which “[t]he statutory text [of 28 U.S.C. § 1291] provides no basis.” Sell
v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 189 n.4 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
47. See, e.g., H. Joon Chung, Comment, Collateral Order—Knee-Deep in Confusion:
Its Continuing Saga—Sell v. United States, 123 S. Ct. 2174 (2003), 9 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL &
APP. ADVOC. 153, 156 (2004) (“[T]he Court’s application of the collateral order doctrine has
a checkered history, replete with inconsistency and confusion.”); Steinman, supra note 15, at
1247–57 (describing and critiquing the collateral order doctrine).
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not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation.’” 48 Arguably, any
defendant with a strong defense has an interest in avoiding the burdens of
litigation. 49 But only when the right derives from an immunity does the
Supreme Court consider the right not to stand trial important enough to
protect before the fact.50 “[I]t is not mere avoidance of a trial, but
avoidance of a trial that would imperil a substantial public interest, that
counts when asking whether an order is ‘effectively’ unreviewable if review
is to be left until later.” 51 Of course, the existence of a “substantial public
interest” is a simple value judgment—a subjective assessment of
substantiality.
Congress, for its part, began making such value judgments in 1891, when
it first permitted an appeal of right from “an interlocutory order or decree
Appeals of right from
granting or continuing [an] injunction.”52
interlocutory orders “refusing” injunctions were authorized four years
later, 53 and appeals of right from interlocutory decrees in admiralty cases
were authorized in 1926. 54 In 1948, when reorganizing the Judicial Code,
Congress also established the right of appeal from certain interlocutory

48. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1946 (2009) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472
U.S. 511, 526 (1985)).
49. See, e.g., Digital Equip., 511 U.S. at 873 (“We have, after all, acknowledged that
virtually every right that could be enforced appropriately by pretrial dismissal might loosely
be described as conferring a ‘right not to stand trial.’” (quoting Midland Asphalt Corp. v.
United States, 489 U.S. 794, 802 (1989))); see also Waters, supra note 9, at 567 (“[C]ourts
may not consider the added delay or expense of unnecessary litigation in determining
whether a ruling qualifies for collateral order treatment.”). But see Davidson, supra note 10,
at 206–11 (arguing that the right not to stand trial is a substantial right that justifies exercise
of appellate jurisdiction, under the collateral-order doctrine, over orders denying summary
judgment); Redish, supra note 25, at 118–19 (discussing Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp., 379
U.S. 148 (1964)) (the Supreme Court has occasionally, albeit only implicitly, recognized that
the “expense of preparing and conducting a trial which might ultimately prove unnecessary”
is harm enough to justify the right of immediate appeal).
50. See Digital Equip., 511 U.S. at 873–81 (holding that a trial court’s disregard of the
right to avoid trial under a settlement agreement is not important enough for immediate
appellate review under the collateral-order doctrine); see also Steinman, supra note 15, at
1255–56 (“The only plausible basis for distinguishing” between immunity and settlement “is
a value judgment about which right is more deserving of immediate appellate correction.
Reasonable people may disagree about how to rank these two rulings, but it is complete
fiction to say that one is a ‘final decision’ and the other is not.” (quoting Digital Equip., 511
U.S. at 864)).
51. Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 353 (2006) (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,
437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978)).
52. Circuit Court of Appeals (Evarts) Act, ch. 517, § 7, 26 Stat. 826, 828 (1891) (current
version at 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (2006)); see also Balt. Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348
U.S. 176, 180 (1955) (“The provision for interlocutory appeals was first introduced in 1891
when the circuit courts of appeals were established as intermediate appellate courts.”).
53. Act of Feb. 18, 1895, ch. 96, 28 Stat. 666, 666–67 (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(a)(1)). Curiously, the right to appeal from orders refusing injunctions was effectively
repealed in 1900, see Act of June 6, 1900, ch. 803, 31 Stat. 660, and then reinstated in 1911.
See All Writs Act, Pub. L. No. 61-475, ch. 231, § 129, 36 Stat. 1087, 1134 (1911); see also
Balt. Contractors, 348 U.S. at 180 n.6 (“This [1900] amendment had the effect of repealing
the 1895 provision which was restored in § 129 of the Judicial Code of 1911.”).
54. Act of Apr. 3, 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-89, ch. 102, 44 Stat. 233, 233–34 (current
version at 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3)).
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orders involving receiverships. 55 In an effort to glean meaning from these
enactments, the Supreme Court in 1955 found “[n]o discussion of the
underlying reasons for modifying the rule of finality . . . in the legislative
history.” 56 The Court nevertheless inferred that “the changes seem plainly
to spring from a developing need to permit litigants to effectually challenge
interlocutory orders of serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence.” 57
Of course, that language—“serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence”—
begs the question. As with the collateral-order doctrine, these statutorily
created rights of appeal have hinged on a determination of importance. But
the determination is inherently subjective; the words “serious” and
“irreparable” identify the dividing line but offer no guidance on the value
judgments that identify where to draw it and when the competing
considerations of judicial economy outweigh the need for immediate
review. 58 The value judgments are “based on preference, personal
experience, or even bias, [and some] may have a greater distaste for certain
types of irreparable harm than others.” 59 Those particular policy choices
have ultimately been made each time Congress has expanded mandatory
appellate jurisdiction by statute or the Supreme Court has recognized a
category of collateral orders.
The most recent statutory expansion of interlocutory appeals of right
illustrates the point. In 1988, Congress authorized appeals of right from
interlocutory orders that refuse to enforce contractual arbitration clauses.60
But the same legislation that created the immediate right to appeal from an
order denying arbitration specified that interlocutory orders enforcing
arbitration rights are not immediately appealable.61 Presumably, Congress
drew a distinction between enforcing and refusing to enforce arbitration
rights after concluding that an erroneous decision to refer a matter to
55. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Rules of Decisions Act, Pub. L. No. 80-773, ch.
646, §§ 1291–94, 62 Stat. 869, 929–30 (1948) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(a)(2)).
56. Balt. Contractors, 348 U.S. at 181. The Supreme Court seems to have ignored the
legislative history that establishes a Congressional concern with outsized district court
power, at least in the legislative history of the Evarts Act. See Paul D. Carrington & Roger
C. Cramton, Judicial Independence in Excess: Reviving the Judicial Duty of the Supreme
Court, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 587, 592 (2009) (“At the time of the enactment [of the Evarts
Act], Congress was concerned with the excesses of judicial discretion vested in federal trial
judges that had resulted from the weakness of a system of appellate review that depended
entirely on the Supreme Court.”).
57. Balt. Contractors, 348 U.S. at 181 (emphasis added).
58. Similarly, in 1984, Professor Paul D. Carrington proposed permitting a right of
interlocutory appeal “when essential to protect substantial rights which cannot be effectively
enforced on review after final decision.” Carrington, supra note 32, at 167. The difficulty, of
course, is coming to agreement on defining those rights.
59. Glynn, supra note 17, at 245–46.
60. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1019(a),
102 Stat. 4642, 4671 (1988) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. § 16(a) (2006)). Under this
statute, a defendant who loses a motion to compel arbitration “can take an immediate appeal
of the district court’s order.” Bergeron, supra note 33, at 1366; see also Arthur Andersen
LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896, 1900 (2009); Martineau, supra note 26, at 734–35.
61. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1019(b),
102 Stat. 4642, 4671 (1988) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. § 16(b)).
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arbitration can effectively be corrected after the arbitration proceeding is
concluded, so there is no immediate, perhaps irreparable, consequence (or
important right lost) by proceeding unnecessarily with arbitration—or, if
there is, the need for judicial economy outweighs the need for immediate
vindication. By contrast, Congress implicitly concluded that an erroneous
refusal to refer a matter to arbitration results in an immediate deprivation of
rights that a later appeal cannot remedy. In effect, Congress made a
subjective determination that the right to avoid trial is as significant in the
arbitration context as the Supreme Court (subjectively) held it to be in the
immunity context. That legislative value judgment was particularly
important, because it essentially overrode judicial determinations that the
refusal to enforce an arbitration clause did not give rise to mandatory
appellate jurisdiction under the collateral-order doctrine. 62
Thus, the absolute right of appellate review under the collateral-order
doctrine and the statutory-based exceptions to the final-judgment rule share
a common trait. They reflect a decision by the Court (in the case of the
collateral-order doctrine) and Congress (in the cases of statutory-based
jurisdiction) to craft a rule permitting immediate access to appellate courts
in every circumstance that comes within the rule. Their sweep is broad; if a
particular type of order is a collateral order, for example, then it is always
immediately appealable regardless of the specific facts that enhance or
minimize the need for immediate review in a particular case.63 In
evaluating appellate jurisdiction, courts have the power to decide whether a
particular order falls within the rule, but they have no discretion to deny
appellate jurisdiction over orders that do.
Litigants and courts may struggle to determine whether a particular case
comes within the rule, as we see from the numerous Supreme Court
decisions construing and reshaping the collateral-order doctrine. 64 But
these disputes are around the edges. The larger, subjective policy choices
provide an overarching sense of predictability and uniformity, and they
ensure that interlocutory orders fitting the established criteria will always
enjoy the benefits of immediate review. 65
Over the last few decades, we have seen no expansion of mandatory
appellate jurisdiction. Instead, we have seen Congress play hot potato over
the issue by vesting in the Supreme Court the power, through its rulemaking
authority, to expand mandatory appellate jurisdiction through new
62. See, e.g., Alascom, Inc. v. ITT N. Elec. Co., 727 F.2d 1419, 1421 (9th Cir. 1984);
Langley v. Colonial Leasing Co., 707 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1983).
63. Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 605 (2009) (quoting Coopers &
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 473 (1978)).
64. See Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 350–53 (2006) (discussing cases); see also
Chung, supra note 47, at 158 (explaining that the Court at least on one occasion “abandoned
strict adherence to its three-prong test for the collateral order exception” and instead “used a
form of heightened constitutional scrutiny—weighing ‘the severity of [governmental]
intrusion and corresponding importance of the constitutional issue’” (quoting Sell v. United
States, 539 U.S. 166, 177 (2003))).
65. But see Steinman, supra note 15, at 1256–57 (inconsistent application of the
collateral-order doctrine has rendered it “in practice . . . discretionary rather than
mandatory”).
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categories of appealable interlocutory orders 66 and through expanded
definitions of “final” orders under § 1291. 67 The Supreme Court has never
exercised these powers. 68
2. Discretionary Appellate Jurisdiction, Whereby the Supreme Court or
Congress Has Delegated to the Lower Courts the Task of Making Case-byCase Value Judgments
Some individual orders that are worthy of immediate appeal fall outside
the broad categories that govern mandatory appellate jurisdiction. In
navigating the delicate balance between meaningful appellate review and
avoiding piecemeal appeals, Congress and the Supreme Court have created
interlocutory appellate jurisdiction over certain interlocutory orders, but the
lower courts hold the power to permit or deny review in a particular case.
For these discretionary appeals, the value judgments and balancing tests are
conducted on a case-by-case basis rather than in broad categories, and they
are conducted by the lower courts, not by Congress or the Supreme Court.
In these situations, appellate jurisdiction is governed by flexible standards
rather than hard-and-fast rules.
There are five principal routes to discretionary appellate review over
interlocutory orders, and they are a motley crew.69 Perhaps the most
commonly attempted route is certification under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
Enacted in 1958, 70 the statute permits appeals from interlocutory orders in
civil cases if both the trial court and the court of appeals believe the order
“involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial
ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the
order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.”71
The would-be appellant must identify a discrete issue of law and persuade
both the trial court and the appellate court that immediate review is
warranted.
The Court has also promulgated a rule, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
54(b), that permits a trial court to enter final judgment “as to one or more,
but fewer than all, claims or parties” by “expressly determin[ing] that there
is no just reason for delay.” 72 While the entry of final judgment under Rule
54(b) creates an appeal of right, the threshold decision whether to invoke
66. Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 101, 106 Stat.
4506, 4506 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) (2006)).
67. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 315, 104 Stat. 5089,
5115 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2072(c) (2006)).
68. The Supreme Court has used its delegated power to expand only discretionary
appellate jurisdiction by rule and has done so only once. See infra text accompanying notes
80–85; see also Steinman, supra note 15, at 1239 (the Supreme Court’s “rulemaking
authority has remained largely dormant”).
69. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
70. Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-919, 72 Stat. 1770 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b)); see also Steinman, supra note 15, at 1244–45.
71. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). An analogous statute permits certification of interlocutory
appeals in bankruptcy cases. See id. § 158(d)(2)(A).
72. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b).
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the rule is left to the district court’s discretion. 73 Because Rule 54(b)
applies only to orders that resolve entire claims, it has no reliable
application to the kinds of MDL orders described in this Article.
A court of appeals also has the power to issue a writ of mandamus
commanding a trial court to confine itself to “‘a lawful exercise of its
prescribed jurisdiction.’” 74 This power springs from the language of 28
U.S.C. § 1651(a), 75 which authorizes federal courts to “issue all writs
necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and
agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”76 The Supreme Court has
cautioned that the writ of mandamus is “a ‘drastic and extraordinary’
remedy ‘reserved for really extraordinary causes.’” 77 “[W]hether to grant
the writ is always up to the appellate court’s discretion,” 78 and the standards
“defy precision.” 79
The fourth avenue of discretionary review over interlocutory orders is
unique to a particular category—class-certification orders. The Supreme
Court promulgated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) in 1998,
conferring on appellate courts discretionary jurisdiction over “an order
granting or denying class-action certification.”80 Twenty years earlier, the
Court had refused to deem class-action orders categorically “final” under
the collateral-order doctrine, even while recognizing that “[c]ertification of
a large class may so increase the defendant’s potential damages liability and
litigation costs that he may find it economically prudent to settle and to
abandon a meritorious defense.” 81 While class-certification orders were
sometimes reviewed under an appellate court’s mandamus power 82 or under
73. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 8 (1980).
74. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004) (quoting Roche v. Evaporated
Milk Ass’n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943)). The Court has also held that a writ of mandamus may
be appropriate to resolve an “issue of first impression.” Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S.
104, 111 (1964). The Cheney decision cited Schlagenhauf and distinguished, but did not
overrule, that aspect of its holding. See Cheney, 542 U.S. at 391. Commentators have
observed that the Supreme Court’s mandamus jurisprudence has sent “inconsistent
messages” as to the appropriate standard. E.g., Steinman, supra note 15, at 1264.
75. See Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Rules of Decisions Act, Pub. L. No. 80-773, ch.
47, 62 Stat. 869, 944 (1948) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006)).
76. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).
77. Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380 (quoting Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 259–60 (1947)); see
also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 15.11 (4th ed. 2004) (“Appellate courts grant these
writs rarely, limiting them to situations where the trial court has clearly committed legal
error, and a party is entitled to relief but cannot obtain it through other means.” (citing Kerr
v. U.S. Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402–03 (1976))); Davidson, supra note 10, at 199
(“Although frequently sought, writs of mandamus rarely are issued.” (citing Allied Chem.
Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 36 (1980); Doughty v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London,
6 F.3d 856, 865 (1st Cir. 1993); In re United States, 10 F.3d 931, 933 (2d Cir. 1993))).
78. Steinman, supra note 15, at 1265.
79. Glynn, supra note 17, at 200–01; see also Robertson, supra note 22, at 758 (“[T]he
different standards applied by the circuits lead to different results.”).
80. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). The promulgation of Rule 23(f) was the first (and so far only)
instance of Supreme Court rulemaking on interlocutory appellate jurisdiction, as authorized
by the Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 101, 106 Stat.
4506, 4506 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) (2006)); see also supra note 68.
81. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 476 (1978).
82. See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1295 (7th Cir. 1995).
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§ 1292(b), 83 the promulgation of Rule 23(f) reflected the prevailing view
that these avenues were often inadequate. 84 Under Rule 23(f), the court of
appeals examines each petition to determine whether, in its sole discretion,
the benefits of interlocutory review in a particular case outweigh the costs.
The appellate courts have not articulated uniform standards for conducting
that cost-benefit analysis; there are “disparate Rule 23(f) standards among
circuits.” 85
The final category of discretionary jurisdiction, like Rule 23(f), is unique
to class actions. With the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 86 Congress
conferred discretionary appellate jurisdiction over orders remanding or
refusing to remand class actions from federal court back to state court if the
case was originally filed in state court and subsequently removed. 87 Once
again, the decision whether to accept an appeal implicates the appellate
court’s subjective assessment of the “balance of relevant harms.” 88
All of these routes of discretionary appellate jurisdiction can open the
appellate courthouse doors to litigants who successfully tug at the
heartstrings of the court of appeals or the district court (or sometimes both)
with a plea for immediate review. But the jurisdictional pleas often fall on
deaf ears. Trial judges who eschew appellate review can consistently refuse
to certify legal questions for discretionary review under § 1292(b),
rendering that avenue “useless.” 89 Even when trial courts certify, the
83. See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 737 (5th Cir. 1996).
84. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1778 n.4 (2010)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (Rule 23(f), “adopted in response to Coopers & Lybrand, gives
Courts of Appeals discretion to permit an appeal from an order granting or denying classaction certification.”).
85. Charles R. Florest, Appealing Class Action Certification Decisions Under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), 4 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 27, 57 (2007); see also Barry
Sullivan & Amy Kobelski Trueblood, Rule 23(f): A Note on Law and Discretion in the
Courts of Appeals, 246 F.R.D. 277, 284–85 (2008) (explaining that most decisions on Rule
23(f) petitions fail to explain the courts’ reasons for accepting or rejecting the interlocutory
appeals).
86. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.).
87. See id. § 5, 119 Stat. at 12 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c) (2006)); see also
Steinman, supra note 15, at 1245–46.
88. E.g., Coll. of Dental Surgeons v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 585 F.3d 33, 39 (1st Cir.
2009).
89. Waters, supra note 9, at 558 (Section 1292(b)’s “usefulness in the mass tort context
is undermined by the fact that it permits interlocutory review only if the trial judge agrees to
certify the order to the court of appeals.”); see RICHARD H. FIELD, BENJAMIN KAPLAN &
KEVIN M. CLERMONT, MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 1567 (10th ed.
2010) (“District court certificates under § 1292(b) are rare . . . .”); Bergeron, supra note 33,
at 1368 (“Permissive interlocutory review continues to be rarely invoked by district
judges . . . .”); Davidson, supra note 10, at 197 (“[I]n practice, district and circuit courts
permit few section 1292(b) appeals.”); Glynn, supra note 17, at 266 (“District court
certification is rare. . . . Indeed, the district court judge has strong incentives to refuse
certification . . . [and] circuit courts inexplicably refuse to hear many certified questions.”);
Martineau, supra note 26, at 766 (“[C]onditioning an interlocutory appeal on a trial judge
certifying an order for appeal is inadequate because the judge may lack sufficient
objectivity.”); Redish, supra note 25, at 97 (“Because ‘[t]he trial judge is in a unique position
of authority over the day-to-day actions of individuals,’ . . . ‘[m]egalomania is an
occupational hazard of the judicial office.’” (quoting Paul D. Carrington, Crowded Dockets
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appellate courts typically refuse to accept the appeals; 90 as a result, appeals
under § 1292(b) “comprise well fewer than one percent of all appeals.”91
And the law provides no meaningful standard for knowing when a court
will permit discretionary interlocutory review; the Supreme Court candidly
has acknowledged that a discretionary standard permits “[t]he appellate
court [to] deny the appeal for any reason, including docket congestion.”92
Thus, “[d]espite the Court’s frequent reference to section 1292(b),
commentators generally discount its effectiveness as a safety valve for
interlocutory appeals, since it has been historically utilized infrequently.”93
Appellate courts are even more grudging in their willingness to entertain a
petition for a writ of mandamus; 94 in fiscal year 2000, for example, only
2.3% of mandamus petitions succeeded, translating to about 1.33 successful
mandamus petitions per circuit per year.95
Ultimately the standard in discretionary appeals boils down to whether
the court wants to hear the case. For the most part, we can live with that.
We want courts to accept appeals from interlocutory orders that raise a
“serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence,” but we do not want to burden
them by requiring them to hear appeals from orders that do not. Many
cases defy easy categorization, so the discretionary standard, while
imperfect, provides needed flexibility. But when we can identify categories
of cases in which the infrequency and unpredictability of discretionary
review are unacceptable, the discretionary standard is inadequate. In those
cases, any meaningful right of appellate jurisdiction must be in the form of
a mandatory rule, leaving the courts no discretion to keep the door closed.

and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function of Review and the National Law, 82
HARV. L. REV. 542, 550 (1969))); Robertson, supra note 22, at 762 (“From the district
court’s perspective, there is little incentive to certify orders for appeal; an interlocutory
appeal increases the opportunities for reversal . . . .”).
90. See, e.g., Bergeron, supra note 33, at 1368 (district court judge certifications are
“rarely accepted by their appellate colleagues”); Glynn, supra note 17, at 246 (“[T]he rate at
which circuit courts grant review of orders certified under § 1292(b) . . . is surprising[ly]
low.”); Martineau, supra note 26, at 734 (“[I]n a substantial percentage of cases the courts of
appeals exercise their discretion to refuse to hear appeals certified by a district court under
section 1292(b).”); Nagel, supra note 42, at 219 (“Section 1292(b) is seldom a successful
route to an interlocutory appeal.”); Solimine, supra note 33, at 1174 (“Perhaps the most
telling characteristic of section 1292(b) appeals, however, is how few certified appeals are
accepted by the circuit courts.”).
91. FIELD, KAPLAN & CLERMONT, supra note 89, at 1567.
92. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 475 (1978).
93. Solimine, supra note 33, at 1193; see also Martineau, supra note 26, at 768
(“[Section 1292] grants the district court and the court of appeals too much discretion to
deny certification and applications for review.” (citing Redish, supra note 25, at 108–09));
Waters, supra note 9, at 559 (Section 1292(b) “may be inadequate in many modern complex
cases.”). The discretion to deny review is particularly ironic given the de novo standard of
review that applies to issues of law that an appellate court reviews if it accepts an appeal
under § 1292(b). In effect, the discretionary standard for getting in the door undermines the
rigorous standard of substantive review.
94. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
95. FIELD, KAPLAN & CLERMONT, supra note 89, at 1579.
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C. The Commentators’ and Reformers’ Primary Focus: Expanding
Discretionary, Rather Than Mandatory, Appellate Jurisdiction
There is certainly no shortage of commentators willing to criticize the
existing rules of appellate jurisdiction. 96 Professor Adam N. Steinman
posits that “[a]ppellate jurisdiction over interlocutory trial-court rulings is
Many
among the most troublesome issues in civil procedure.”97
commentators focus on the inconsistent application of, and the labyrinthian
exceptions to, the defined rules.98 Professor Paul D. Carrington has
criticized “the reluctance of courts of appeals to be candid in
acknowledging the nature and regularity of the exceptions being made” to
the final-judgment rule. 99 A major focus of these commentators is “to
inquire whether all this complexity can be simplified.” 100
Commentators who look beyond the complexity and focus on the scope
of available appellate review almost uniformly agree that existing avenues
for interlocutory appeal are inadequate. 101 By and large, however, those
who would expand appellate jurisdiction advocate expanding avenues of
discretionary appeal. 102 Some scholars would even replace the current
blend of mandatory and discretionary jurisdiction with an all-discretionary
system. 103 Most believe that the dual-discretion system of § 1292(b) should
be replaced by a system that vests sole discretion in the court of appeals—
as the drafters of § 1292(b) originally proposed in 1958.104 These
96. See Howard B. Eisenberg & Alan B. Morrison, Discretionary Appellate Review of
Non-Final Orders: It’s Time To Change the Rules, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 285, 291
(1999) (“There is widespread dissatisfaction with the present state of the law regarding
appeals from non-final orders.”); see also Martineau, supra note 26, at 748–70 (describing
various proposals for change).
97. Steinman, supra note 15, at 1237; see also id. at 1241 (lamenting the “host of
conceptual, doctrinal, and procedural problems” in the current system).
98. See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 32, at 165–66 (lamenting “the unconscionable
intricacy of the existing law”); Nagel, supra note 42, at 200 (describing “widespread”
dissatisfaction with the “patchwork of exceptions to the final judgment rule”); Redish, supra
note 25, at 91 (the federal courts’ “pragmatic approach” to appellate jurisdiction “has given
rise to considerable confusion”); Robertson, supra note 22, at 736 (“[I]t is not surprising that
some courts, frustrated with the current scheme, have expressed a desire for greater
uniformity.”); Steinman, supra note 15, at 1238–39 (collecting other authorities). But see
Glynn, supra note 17, at 201 (“Today, contrary to common belief, the existing exceptions are
relatively clear and easy for federal courts and litigants to understand and apply. They
therefore produce little controversy or collateral litigation in the circuit courts.”).
99. Carrington, supra note 32, at 166.
100. E.g., Cooper, supra note 29, at 157.
101. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 25, at 92 (“[E]xisting exceptions to the [finality]
rule . . . do not adequately serve the interests of justice in many instances.”).
102. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 29, at 161; Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 96, at
287; Martineau, supra note 26, at 788; Nagel, supra note 42, at 201.
103. See, e.g., Carleton M. Crick, The Final Judgment As a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE
L.J. 539, 564 (1932); Dalton, supra note 19, at 97–107 (reserving mandatory appeal, even
after final judgment, for limited categories of cases); see also Martineau, supra note 26, at
775 (describing proposals “to eliminate completely the right to appeal, and to make all
judgments and orders, both final and interlocutory, appealable only in the discretion of the
court of appeals”).
104. See Solimine, supra note 33, at 1171–72. The discretionary-appeal movement
resulting in § 1292(b) began in earnest in 1951, when “Judge Jerome Frank . . . presented a
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reformers believe that trial judges can never serve as adequate gate-keepers
of appellate review when they have a vested interest in preventing reversal,
but they retain confidence in the ability of the appellate courts to exercise
discretion when appropriate. 105
The American Bar Association (ABA) has twice advanced proposals for
vesting sole discretion in the court of appeals. The first proposal, in 1977,
would have replaced § 1292(b) with a standard directed exclusively to the
appellate courts’ discretion; 106 Wisconsin adopted this standard in 1978, but
no other jurisdiction has done so. 107 And in 1989, the ABA contemplated,
and then withdrew, a proposal for discretionary appellate review of
interlocutory orders in mass-tort cases as part of a larger, unsuccessful
proposal to nationalize mass-tort litigation.108 The American Law Institute
made a similar suggestion for discretionary review in connection with its
1993 recommendations for managing complex litigation. 109
Some commentators have advocated a greater resort to the writ of
mandamus as a means of securing discretionary interlocutory review.110
Professor Melissa A. Waters, for example, advocates the application of
various factors—irreparable harm, errors by the district court, and novelty
of the legal issues involved—to test whether an interlocutory trial-court
order in a mass-tort case is worthy of mandamus review. 111 Professor
proposal to the United States Judicial Conference that a court of appeals be granted
discretion to review an interlocutory order if it finds that review is necessary to avoid
substantial injustice.” Martineau, supra note 26, at 751 (citing Judicial Conference of the
U.S., Report of the Judicial Conference of the United States 32 (1951)); see also Nagel,
supra note 42, at 215 n.116.
105. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 29, at 159; Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 96, at
301–02; Robertson, supra note 22, at 773.
106. ABA COMM’N ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMIN., STANDARDS RELATING TO
APPELLATE COURTS § 3.12(b), at 25 (1977). The ABA’s 1977 proposal permitted
discretionary appeals for any interlocutory order if the appeal would “(1) Materially advance
the termination of the litigation or clarify further proceedings therein; (2) Protect a party
from substantial and irreparable injury; or (3) Clarify an issue of general importance in the
administration of justice.” Id.; see also Robertson, supra note 22, at 773–74.
107. Martineau, supra note 26, at 777 (citing WIS. STAT. ANN. § 808.03 (West Supp.
1992)); see also Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 96, at 297–302 (lauding the Wisconsin
system). Wisconsin’s experience is of limited utility in fashioning an appropriate system of
interlocutory review for significant MDL orders. See infra note 322.
108. The ABA’s recommendation would have authorized “[a] Court of Appeals [to]
permit an appeal to be taken from an interlocutory order of a transferee court entered [in an
MDL case] if application therefor is made within ten days after entry of such order.” ABA
COMM’N ON MASS TORTS, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES app. D at 7d (1989). But
the overall proposal was met with numerous concerns surrounding state sovereignty, so the
ABA House of Delegates initially voted to “defer consideration of the package until the
commission addresses some of these concerns.” See 58 U.S.L.W. 2109 (Aug. 22, 1989). The
proposal was later withdrawn. See 58 U.S.L.W. 2477 (Feb. 20, 1990).
109. AM. LAW INST., COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS AND
ANALYSIS § 3.07(C), at 130 (1994); id. § 3.07(C) cmt. D at 138–41.
110. See, e.g., Waters, supra note 9, at 591.
111. See id. at 594 (quoting Bauman v. U.S. Dist. Court, 557 F.2d 650, 654–55 (9th Cir.
1977)); see also id. at 596–98 (elaborating on factors). But Professor Waters cautions that
mandamus should not “‘expand[] into a method of permissive interlocutory appeal.’” Id. at
593 (quoting 16 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3933, at 527 (2d ed. 1996)).
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Robertson has advocated the use of mandamus in cases involving discovery
of privileged matter if the trial court refuses to certify a discretionary appeal
under § 1292(b). 112 And Professor Steinman believes that appellate courts
already possess, and need to begin to use, the full power to exercise
discretionary appellate review under § 1651. 113
These suggested routes of discretionary appellate jurisdiction are
sufficient in certain circumstances, particularly when the trial-court order
has minimal impact or reflects the exercise of the trial court’s own
discretion. But when a trial court commits an error of law that has an
outsized impact, the availability of immediate appellate review should not
depend on the subjective value judgments of a single appellate panel
deciding a petition for discretionary review or for a writ of mandamus.
While the occasional scholar has expressed skepticism of the alldiscretionary solution, 114 only one commentator, Professor Timothy P.
Glynn, has offered a comprehensive explanation for why “discretionary
review is the wrong approach” and urged the adoption of a system of
mandatory appellate jurisdiction for certain types of interlocutory orders.115
As Professor Glynn demonstrates, it is not only the trial courts, but also the
appellate courts, that inhibit access to discretionary review.116 A
discretionary system is too vulnerable to the whims and prejudices of
individual judges who deny discretionary appeals in cases they wish to
avoid 117 and have no obligation to justify or explain why they do so. 118 At
the very least, it leaves important value judgments—judgments that should
be made on a global level in certain cases—in the hands of the random
panel of judges assigned to accept or reject discretionary review in a
particular case.
The dangers of a discretionary system are not limited to the injustices
that can occur in an individual case. The detriment to the judicial system is
far more insidious. A discretionary standard ensures that access to
interlocutory review will depend on the luck of the judicial draw. Two
cases may present identical facts, issues, and arguments for immediate
review, but only one may succeed. That inconsistency undermines the
112. See Robertson, supra note 22, at 778–79.
113. See Steinman, supra note 15, at 1242–43; see also id. at 1278–86. Professor
Steinman believes that his construction of § 1651 could supplant the courts’ resort to the
collateral-order doctrine and writs of mandamus.
114. See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 29, at 175 (“I do not see the transformation of rules
into discretion as a positive or promising movement in this context.”).
115. Glynn, supra note 17, at 229, 259–62.
116. Id. at 241 (“[T]he circuit courts’ surprisingly low rate of review of orders certified
under § 1292(b) suggests that the circuit courts resist giving themselves more work, even
when the total impact on their caseloads would be minimal.”); see also supra note 89 and
accompanying text.
117. Glynn, supra note 17, at 252–53 (“In addition to being largely ineffective in serving
the lawmaking function, discretionary review is dangerous” because “circuit judges easily
can avoid articulating, reiterating, or enforcing legal principles or conclusions they dislike by
denying review.”); id. at 245 (“[J]udges may allow personal preferences . . . to creep into
their decision whether to grant review.”).
118. Id. at 249 (“A circuit panel armed with such discretion can ignore reversible error for
any reason, without comment, and without downstream consequences.”).
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integrity of our process and our conception of justice. “The power to decide
what to decide . . . weakens the influence of precedent and allows personal
views and preferences to have a greater impact on the application and
substance of the law.” 119 In the end, a discretionary regime leads to the
twin evils—“procedural unpredictability and substantive uncertainty”—that
threaten our confidence in legal rules built on stare decisis,120 particularly
when the absence of interlocutory review can have devastating
consequences.
Professor Glynn thus shares my view that the courts should have no
discretion to deny appellate jurisdiction over some categories of
interlocutory orders, which he calls “problem areas.” 121 But Professor
Glynn has not identified any particular problem areas,122 and other
commentators have suggested that doing so is “virtually impossible.”123 I
disagree. As I demonstrate below, certain kinds of interlocutory orders in
MDL cases qualify as “problem areas” that courts of appeals should have
no discretion to refuse to review.
II. THE MASSIVE IMPACT OF INTERLOCUTORY LEGAL RULINGS IN MDL
CASES
The need to expand the right of appeal in MDL proceedings stems from
the exaggerated impact of interlocutory legal decisions in MDL cases. One
legal ruling by one judge can reallocate liability risks in thousands of
individual lawsuits. That outsized impact is not surprising; the MDL
system was designed to centralize power for the sake of efficiency, and its
use has grown spectacularly since its inception. As I describe in this part,
the increasing consolidation ratchets up the risk and consequences of legal
error, rendering both settlement and trial untenable options. To illustrate
the point, I examine three questionable interlocutory legal decisions in a
pending MDL proceeding, In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE)
Products Liability Litigation, 124 and the unsuccessful efforts to appeal from
them.
A. The Purpose, Scope, and Spectacular Growth of MDL Proceedings
The MDL statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1407, was enacted in 1968 “[t]o provide
for the temporary transfer to a single district for coordinated or consolidated
pretrial proceedings of civil actions pending in different districts which

119. Id. at 253.
120. See Robertson, supra note 22, at 759, 770; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW § 20.4, at 591 (7th ed. 2007) (“[D]ecision in accordance with precedent
reduces uncertainty about one’s legal rights and obligations.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78
(Alexander Hamilton) (purpose of stare decisis is “[t]o avoid an arbitrary discretion in the
courts”).
121. Glynn, supra note 17, at 259.
122. Id. at 261–62.
123. E.g., Martineau, supra note 26, at 775.
124. In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1358, 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14901 (J.P.M.L. Oct. 10, 2000).
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involve one or more common questions of fact, and for other purposes.” 125
The legislation vested in the U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
(JPML) the “authority to transfer all cases relating to similar litigation to a
single judge for pretrial proceedings.” 126
An MDL proceeding is authorized “[w]hen civil actions involving one or
more common questions of fact are pending in different districts,” when
“transfers for such proceedings will be for the convenience of parties and
witnesses,” and when transfers “will promote the just and efficient conduct
of such actions.” 127 A party or the JPML itself may initiate MDL
proceedings. 128 The JPML bases its decision to consolidate cases into an
MDL “on the number and nature of similar cases pending and likely to be
filed, with importance given to whether it will further the ultimate
resolution of the litigation.” 129 Parties and counsel involved in potential
“tag-along actions”—that is, subsequently filed actions involving the same
“common questions of fact” 130—are required to notify the JPML of the new
actions, 131 which are then conditionally transferred into the MDL through a
summary process. 132 Though consolidated for pretrial purposes, each
action aggregated within the MDL proceeding remains a separate action,
“theoretically independent” from the others.133 A judge in an MDL
proceeding may choose to accelerate some of these actions by denominating
them “‘focus actions’ for early discovery and trial within the MDL.”134
MDL consolidation inevitably centralizes in the transferee judge the
power to render the important legal decisions. While the consolidation
standard under § 1407(a) is the existence of “common questions of fact,”
and while “greater complexity of factual issues” increases the likelihood of

125. Multidistrict Litigation Act, Pub. L. No. 90-296, 82 Stat. 109 (1968) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006)).
126. Sherman, supra note 7, at 2209 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000)); see also Courtney
E. Silver, Note, Procedural Hassles in Multidistrict Litigation: A Call for Reform of 28
U.S.C. § 1407 and the Lexecon Result, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 455, 455 (2009). The MDL statute
tracked a consolidation trend that simultaneously took place within the judicial districts;
while cases are now assigned immediately to a single judge from the moment of filing, cases
before the late 1960s “were not assigned to any particular judge until they were ready for
trial,” so “judges shared responsibility for resolving pretrial matters.” Steven S. Gensler,
Judicial Case Management: Caught in the Crossfire, 60 DUKE L.J. 669, 674–75 (2010).
127. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a); see also Yvette Ostolaza & Michelle Hartmann, Overview of
Multidistrict Litigation Rules at the State and Federal Level, 26 REV. LITIG. 47, 51–56
(2007); Silver, supra note 126, at 456.
128. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(c).
129. Sherman, supra note 7, at 2210.
130. Rules of Procedure of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation [hereinafter
J.P.M.L. R.P.] 1.1.
131. J.P.M.L. R.P. 7.1(a), 7.2(a).
132. J.P.M.L. R.P. 7.1(b); see also Oakley, supra note 7, at 499.
133. See Jack B. Weinstein & Eileen B. Hershenov, The Effect of Equity on Mass Tort
Law, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 269, 281–82.
134. See Orange Cnty. Water Dist. v. Unocal (In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE)
Prods. Liab. Litig.), 522 F. Supp. 2d 557, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). Note that an action may be
tried by the MDL court only if that action was originally filed in that court. See infra note
175.
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MDL consolidation, 135 the MDL system is “flexible” and allows for
“transfer and consolidation based on pragmatic considerations.” 136 Thus,
the JPML’s decisions suggest that the presence of “complex legal . . .
questions” also weighs in favor of initiating an MDL proceeding.137
Indeed, when the JPML declines MDL consolidation, it often bases its
decision on the failure of the “proponents of centralization . . . to persuade
[it] that any common questions of fact and law are sufficiently complex
and/or numerous to justify Section 1407 transfer.” 138
The magnitude of the MDL system is reflected both in the broad
categories of cases consolidated into MDL proceedings 139 and in the
explosive growth in the number of MDLs in the last decade alone. As to
breadth, the statute places no limits on the categories of cases that are
candidates for consolidation, so long as the cases share common facts (and
law) and meet the other pragmatic considerations. The JPML has thus
centralized litigation involving a single disaster, such as an airplane crash140
or an industrial accident,141 as well as claims resulting from allegations of
widespread injury from, inter alia, unreasonably dangerous products 142 and
from violations of antitrust, 143 securities, 144 and consumer-protection
laws. 145 The claims arising out of the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico
were centralized in MDLs in 2010.146

135. See In re Clark Oil & Refining Corp. Antitrust Litig., 364 F. Supp. 458, 459
(J.P.M.L. 1973).
136. Sherman, supra note 7, at 2209.
137. See, e.g., In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1377, 1378
(J.P.M.L. 2003) (emphasis added); In re Wireless Tel. Fed. Cost Recovery Fees Litig., 293
F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1379 (J.P.M.L. 2003) (denying transfer on same grounds).
138. In re New Century Mortg. Corp. Prescreening Litig., 473 F. Supp. 2d 1383, 1384
(J.P.M.L. 2007) (emphasis added); see also In re Ins. Indus. Discriminatory Sales Practices
Litig., 460 F. Supp. 2d 1376, 1377 (J.P.M.L. 2006) (same).
139. For a comprehensive list of all MDL proceedings pending in 2009 or 2010, see U.S.
JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF MULTIDISTRICT
LITIGATION 2010, SUMMARY BY DOCKET OF MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION PENDING AS OF SEPT.
30, 2010, OR CLOSED SINCE OCT. 1, 2009 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 MDL STATISTICAL
ANALYSIS],
available
at
http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/Statistics/
JPML_Statistical_Analysis_of_Multidistrict_Litigation_2010.pdf.
140. See, e.g., In re Air Crash over Makassar Strait, Sulawesi, Indonesia, 626 F. Supp. 2d
1354 (J.P.M.L. 2009).
141. See, e.g., In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec.,
1984, 601 F. Supp. 1035 (J.P.M.L. 1985).
142. See, e.g., In re RC2 Corp. Toy Lead Paint Prods. Liab. Litig., 528 F. Supp. 2d 1374
(J.P.M.L. 2007).
143. See, e.g., In re Nat’l Arbitration Forum Antitrust Litig., 682 F. Supp. 2d 1343
(J.P.M.L. 2010).
144. See, e.g., In re Fairfield Greenwich Group Sec. Litig., 655 F. Supp. 2d 1352
(J.P.M.L. 2009).
145. See, e.g., In re Zicam Cold Remedy Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 655 F. Supp. 2d
1371 (J.P.M.L. 2009).
146. In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon,” MDL No. 2179, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 83268 (J.P.M.L. Aug. 10, 2010) (personal-injury and property-damage claims); In re
BP p.l.c. Sec. Litig., MDL No. 2185, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83263 (J.P.M.L. Aug. 10,
2010) (securities-fraud claims).
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As to growth, the raw numbers illustrate how integral MDL proceedings
have become to our federal court system. Between its inception in 1968
and September 30, 2009, the JPML consolidated 323,258 individual actions
into MDL proceedings. 147 The number of separate actions pending in
MDLs consistently rose from 39,799 in 2000 to 102,545 in 2008. 148 That
increase of more than 250% between 2000 and 2008 is almost fifteen times
higher than the seven-percent increase in total civil cases filed in that same
period (259,517 new cases in 2000 compared with 267,257 in 2008).149
The growth in the total number of pending (as opposed to new) civil cases
also pales in comparison to the growth in the number of cases pending in
MDL proceedings; the total number of all pending civil cases rose only
17.6% between 2000 (250,202 pending cases) and 2008 (294,122 pending
147. JAMES C. DUFF, JUDICIAL BUS. OF U.S. COURTS, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT OF DIRECTOR,
at
tbl.S-20
(2009)
[hereinafter
2009
ANNUAL
REPORT],
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/JudicialBusiness.aspx?doc=/uscourts/St
atistics/JudicialBusiness/2009/tables/S20Sep09.pdf.
148. Id.; JAMES C. DUFF, JUDICIAL BUS. OF U.S. COURTS, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT OF
DIRECTOR, at tbl.S-20 (2008), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics
/JudicialBusiness/2008/tables/S20Sep08.pdf; JAMES C. DUFF, JUDICIAL BUS. OF U.S. COURTS,
2007 ANNUAL REPORT OF DIRECTOR, at tbl.S-20 (2007), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2007/tables/S20Sep07.pdf;
JAMES C. DUFF, JUDICIAL BUS. OF U.S. COURTS, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT OF DIRECTOR, at tbl.S20
(2006),
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics
/JudicialBusiness/2006/tables/s20.pdf; LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM, JUDICIAL BUS. OF U.S.
COURTS, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT OF DIRECTOR, at tbl.S-20 (2005), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2005/tables/s20.pdf; LEONIDAS
RALPH MECHAM, JUDICIAL BUS. OF U.S. COURTS, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT OF DIRECTOR, at
tbl.S-20
(2004),
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/
JudicialBusiness/2004/tables/s20.pdf; LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM, JUDICIAL BUS. OF U.S.
COURTS, 2003 ANNUAL REPORT OF DIRECTOR, at tbl.S-20 (2003), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2003/tables/s20.pdf; LEONIDAS
RALPH MECHAM, JUDICIAL BUS. OF U.S. COURTS, 2002 ANNUAL REPORT OF DIRECTOR, at
tbl.S-20
(2002),
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/
JudicialBusiness/2002/tables/s20sep02.pdf; LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM, JUDICIAL BUS. OF
U.S. COURTS, 2001 ANNUAL REPORT OF DIRECTOR, at tbl.S-20 (2001) [hereinafter 2001
ANNUAL
REPORT],
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/
JudicialBusiness/2001/tables/s20sep01.pdf. In 2009 and 2010, the number of pending
actions in the MDL system dropped significantly; the reductions appear largely attributable
to an unusually high number of terminations in those years, as well as a slight drop in the
number of actions transferred into MDLs in 2009. See 2009 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
147, at tbl.S-20; 2010 MDL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS, supra note 139, at 2 (at section entitled
“Cumulative Summary of Multidistrict Litigation”); U.S. JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT
LITIG., STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION 2009, SUMMARY BY DOCKET OF
MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION PENDING AS OF SEPT. 30, 2009, OR CLOSED SINCE OCT. 1, 2008, at
2 (2009) [hereinafter 2009 MDL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS], available at
http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JPML_Statistical_Analysis_of_Multidistrict_Litigati
on_2009.pdf (at section entitled “Cumulative Summary of Multidistrict Litigation”). The
number of actions transferred into MDLs rose again in 2010. See 2010 MDL STATISTICAL
ANALYSIS, supra note 139, at 2 (at section entitled “Cumulative Summary of Multidistrict
Litigation”).
149. Compare 2009 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 147, at tbl.S-7, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/JudicialBusiness.aspx?doc=/uscourts/St
atistics/JudicialBusiness/2009/tables/S07Sep09.pdf, with 2001 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
148,
at
tbl.S-7,
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/
JudicialBusiness/2001/tables/s07sep01.pdf.
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cases). 150 Thus, by 2008, the 102,545 actions pending in MDLs constituted
more than a third of all federal civil cases pending in that year—resulting in
what Professor Waters calls an “unprecedented reallocation of power in
favor of mass tort trial judges.” 151 MDL litigation “is emerging as the
primary vehicle for the resolution of complex civil cases.” 152
B. The “Serious, Perhaps Irreparable, Consequence” of Legal Error in
MDL Proceedings
1. The Untenable Choice Between Settling and Going to Trial in the Face
of Questionable Legal Rulings
This increased use of MDL proceedings has “obvious benefits.” 153 MDL
consolidation can reduce legal fees that common defendants would
otherwise incur in defending claims scattered throughout various federal
and state courts across the country. 154 Discovery, often the most expensive
phase of litigation,155 can be coordinated to avoid duplication.156 There are
also obvious efficiencies in having a single judge become an expert on the
complex factual and legal issues in a particular MDL proceeding, rather
than requiring multiple judges to learn the facts and the law.157
Coordinating every action in one place, before one judge, all but eliminates
the risk of inconsistent rulings. 158 And that judge, as an expert in the
relevant facts and law and with all the parties before her, is perhaps in the
best position to foster global settlement.159
But MDL consolidation comes at significant cost. Legal error in pretrial
rulings has “effects that go far beyond the mere conduct of litigation.” 160 A

150. Compare 2009 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 147, at tbl.C, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/JudicialBusiness.aspx?doc=/uscourts/St
atistics/JudicialBusiness/2009/appendices/C00Sep09.pdf, with 2001 ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 148, at tbl.C, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/
JudicialBusiness/2001/appendices/c00sep01.pdf.
151. See Waters, supra note 9, at 531.
152. Eldon E. Fallon, Jeremy T. Grabill & Robert Pitard Wynne, Bellwether Trials in
Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2323, 2324 (2008).
153. Orange Cnty. Water Dist. v. Unocal (In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE)
Prods. Liab. Litig.), 522 F. Supp. 2d 557, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
154. Oakley, supra note 7, at 506.
155. See, e.g., Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co. v. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d 580, 588 (5th
Cir. 1992).
156. Oakley, supra note 7, at 506.
157. See In re MTBE, 522 F. Supp. 2d at 558; Oakley, supra note 7, at 513 (“[T]he
process becomes more efficient because of the judge’s expertise.”).
158. Richard L. Marcus, Cure-All for an Era of Dispersed Litigation? Toward a
Maximalist Use of the Multidistrict Litigation Panel’s Transfer Power, 82 TUL. L. REV.
2245, 2270 (2008); see also, e.g., In re Preferential Drug Prods. Pricing Antitrust Litig., 429
F. Supp. 1027, 1029 (J.P.M.L. 1977) (consolidating litigation “under the supervision of a
single court will eliminate the possibilities of . . . inconsistency”); Oakley, supra note 7, at
507 (suggesting expectation that single judge would “rule uniformly on all discovery and
pretrial matters” in cases within an MDL).
159. See Sherman, supra note 7, at 2223.
160. See Cooper, supra note 29, at 162.
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trial judge, in ruling on a motion to dismiss 161 or a motion for summary
judgment, 162 is often required to articulate the law that will govern various
substantive aspects of the parties’ dispute. When the trial judge misstates
the governing law, the parties are forced to choose between two untenable
alternatives: (1) an expensive and risky trial conducted under the wrong
legal standard, with the hope of vindication on appeal after final judgment;
or (2) an unfavorable settlement, the value of which is artificially increased
(for defendants) or decreased (for plaintiffs) by the erroneous rulings. To
be sure, that particular dilemma always exists, even outside MDL
proceedings, when a trial court misstates the governing law or “exert[s]
activist or ideological pressures in ways that would elude appellate
oversight.” 163 But the complexity of MDLs heightens the risk of serious
error, 164 and the number of affected litigants increases the impact of that
error. The product of the heightened risk and the heightened impact results
from the “kingly power” of district court judges, which inspired Congress
to expand the jurisdiction of the appellate courts in the first place. 165 And
that product is precisely the sort of “serious, perhaps irreparable,
consequence” that justifies a categorical right to immediate appellate
review. 166 There are a number of reasons why.
First, and perhaps most obviously, aggregation of the cases also means
aggregation of the amount at stake. 167 While an erroneous legal ruling in a
single lawsuit can render it particularly difficult for a plaintiff to prove
liability or for a defendant to escape it, the financial impact of the legal
ruling is confined to that single dispute. The parties can make rational, if
imperfect, choices about whether to settle, and no one else will be directly
affected. By contrast, pretrial legal rulings in aggregated MDL cases have a
dramatically larger impact. 168 For example, the diabetes drug Rezulin was
161. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) & 12(c).
162. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
163. Gensler, supra note 126, at 678 (citing Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 374, 424–31 (1982)).
164. See Cooper, supra note 29, at 160 (MDL cases “involve difficult law” and “pose
multiple opportunities for error”).
165. 21 CONG. REC. 3404 (1889) (statement of Rep. David Culberson); see also supra
note 56.
166. See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text.
167. ABA COMM’N ON MASS TORTS, supra note 108, at 74.
168. See id. At first blush, this dynamic can appear to be more relevant to defendants
than to plaintiffs. Actions consolidated into MDL proceedings typically have different
plaintiffs but common defendants, so the defendants have more at stake as a result of the
aggregated decision-making. The reality, though, is that most plaintiffs in MDL lawsuits are
represented by common law firms that are compensated based on the results of the case. See,
e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 469,
530 (1994) (“The plaintiffs’ attorneys often will receive a fee based upon a percentage of the
total [settlement] fund . . . .”); Katherine Dirks, Note, Ethical Rules of Conduct in the
Settlement of Mass Torts: A Proposal to Revise Rule 1.8(g), 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 501, 502
(2008) (“Settlement . . . requires that a limited number of plaintiffs’ law firms each represent
a large number of clients and coordinate the settlement on their behalf.”); see also
McCollam, supra note 4, at 48–49 (describing efforts by plaintiffs’ bar to secure “mass”
representations of clients with claims arising out of 2010 BP oil spill in Gulf of Mexico). So
the lawyers, if not the individual plaintiffs, stand to gain or lose significantly from pretrial
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the subject of over 1800 individual product-liability and fraud lawsuits,
alleging severe injury and death, that were consolidated within an MDL
proceeding, 169 and every legal ruling that limited or expanded the right of
recovery had an immediate impact of more than 1800 times what it would
have had in a single lawsuit.170 Simple mathematics reveal the enormous
financial impact—into the billions of dollars for compensatory damages
alone—of a single legal ruling that effectively establishes or precludes
liability. 171
The exaggerated influence of legal rulings works in tandem with the
MDL judge’s power to effectuate global settlement. “[T]here is every
reason to believe that multidistrict centralization increases pressure on
transferee judges to promote an early settlement (since the MDL process
creates incentives for judges to treat settlement as the ultimate goal of
consolidation).” 172 The emphasis on settlement within an MDL proceeding
is unavoidable given the general preference for settlement over trial.173
There is an obvious additional allure in the prospect of resolving multiple
cases simultaneously and avoiding an unmanageable number of trials.174
An MDL judge also knows that if the cases do not settle, they must return

legal rulings affecting the strength of their cases. See McCollam, supra note 4, at 65 (lawyer
for prospective settling BP oil-spill plaintiffs “sounded almost giddy at the prospect of once
again extracting a sizeable settlement from the oil giant”). Rightly or wrongly, the lawyers
have significant influence over settlement decisions. Thus, the consequences of aggregation
are effectively the same for plaintiffs as for defendants.
169. See, e.g., In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., 210 F.R.D. 61, 63–65 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(describing factual allegations and legal theories); 2009 MDL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS, supra
note 148, at 7 (noting, at section entitled “Summary by Docket of Multidistrict Litigation
Pending As of Sept. 30, 2009, or Closed Since Oct. 1, 2008,” that 1868 cases have been
consolidated within Rezulin MDL proceedings).
170. See, e.g., In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., 369 F. Supp. 2d 398, 438 (S.D.N.Y.
2005) (granting defendants’ motion “to exclude proposed testimony of plaintiffs’ experts
that Rezulin can cause liver injury, or exacerbate a pre-existing liver condition, in the
absence of marked elevations of liver enzymes while the patient was taking the
medication”).
171. See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 537,
548 (2005) (describing mean tort awards of around $3,000,000 and median tort awards of
around $1,000,000 for loss of life); see also In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods.
Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 1012, 1015–16 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Aggregating millions of claims on
account of multiple products manufactured and sold across more than ten years makes the
case so unwieldy, and the stakes so large, that settlement becomes almost inevitable—and at
a price that reflects the risk of a catastrophic judgment as much as, if not more than, the
actual merit of the claims.”).
172. Moller, supra note 4, at 883; see also id. at 877 (“Put in economic terms, the MDL
process turns the transferee judge into a kind of central planner, tasked with setting a single
price (the pay-out that defendants will be forced to pay) for all claims in a one-shot
proceeding . . . .”); Waters, supra note 9, at 530 (MDL judges decide cases primarily
“through pretrial rulings and settlement rather than trial”).
173. See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement
Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 320 (1991) (“A trial
is a failure. . . . With some notable exceptions, lawyers, judges, and commentators agree that
pretrial settlement is almost always cheaper, faster, and better than trial.”).
174. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 77, § 20.132 (MDLs “afford a unique
opportunity for the negotiation of a global settlement”).
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to the transferor courts for trial.175 The potential remand creates a further
incentive to be perceived as the hero who resolved the disputes rather than
the ineffectual colleague whose inability to achieve a settlement left her
fellow trial judges with the task of trying each case individually. This
“pressure to compel a settlement . . . exists independently of the value of the
claims at issue.” 176 And the numbers bear out the dynamic: of the 235,258
cases that have exited the MDL system since 1968, 223,126 were
terminated by the transferee court and only 12,132, or about five percent,
were remanded to the transferor court for trial.177
The legal rulings in that pro-settlement environment can thus become
tools for exerting settlement pressure on the parties. And therein lies the
danger. “Many [MDL] judges view their role as ‘getting the parties to a
claims process’—a settlement—as quickly as possible. Confronted with
such a judge, the client can no longer hope to prevail simply because it has
done nothing wrong.” 178 An MDL judge holds the power, with a single
decision, to dramatically recast the risk of liability in tens, hundreds, or
even thousands of cases at a time, 179 sometimes using “fuzzy normative
assumptions” 180 that leave the parties with “the painful choice of bearing
the risk and expense of trial or succumbing to [the] pressures to settle.”181
And to insulate these rulings from appellate scrutiny, the judge may
deliberately refuse to certify an interlocutory appeal under § 1292(b), which
leaves intact the uncertainty and creates additional pressure to settle.182
Centralization in an MDL proceeding also tends to insulate the legal
rulings from the scrutiny of other trial judges handling similar cases.
Outside the MDL system, “[f]requent disagreements are inevitable when
175. Silver, supra note 126, at 456 (“Each transferred action is to be remanded to its
originating district by the [JPML] at or before the conclusion of pretrial proceedings unless it
is previously terminated.” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2006))). In 1998, the Supreme Court
blocked “the use of MDL for trial consolidation of all the cases.” Sherman, supra note 7, at
2206 (citing Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998)). That
ruling has been widely criticized and has inspired reform efforts that would confer on
transferee courts the power to try cases transferred to them as part of an MDL. See generally
Silver, supra note 126, at 479–85.
176. Moller, supra note 4, at 878.
177. See 2009 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 147, at tbl.S-20; see also Waters, supra note
9, at 545 (“[T]he MDL device . . . most often results in settlement or other disposition of the
transferred cases before the transferee judge.”).
178. Marcus, supra note 158, at 2288 (quoting Mark Herrmann, To MDL or Not To
MDL? A Defense Perspective, LITIG., Summer 1998, at 43, 45) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also AM. LAW INST., supra note 109, at 22 (“Since most cases settle before trial,
the[] pretrial decisions [in MDL cases] often effectively dispose of the actions.”).
179. See, e.g., 2010 MDL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS, supra note 139 (identifying numbers of
actions consolidated within each MDL proceeding).
180. Moller, supra note 4, at 862.
181. Davidson, supra note 10, at 150 (citations omitted).
182. Waters, supra note 9, at 558. Professor Michael E. Solimine describes the
“cautionary tale” that “emerges from the . . . Agent Orange litigation, where a lack of
interlocutory appeals certified by the district court judge appeared to play a significant role.”
Solimine, supra note 33, at 1205–06. “Judge [Jack] Weinstein used the uncertainty of the
appellate court’s disposal of the case as an incentive to settle.” Id. at 1206; see also Waters,
supra note 9, at 550 (“Rather than merely acting as a settlement facilitator, Judge Weinstein
exerted tremendous pressure on the parties to settle the case.”).
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649 district judges, reviewed by twelve separate courts of appeals, are all
independently empowered” to interpret the law.183 Each judge contributes
to the development of legal thinking and is subjected to the horizontal
scrutiny of other trial judges grappling with identical issues, leading to
majority and minority viewpoints and ultimate resolution on appeal. 184 But
the MDL system’s delegation of all pretrial decisionmaking to a single
judge eliminates the horizontal scrutiny. Indeed, even when a case returns
for trial to the court in which it was originally filed, 185 that court is unlikely
to reexamine the MDL judge’s pretrial legal rulings. 186 That insulation
defies the normal expectations we have for our legal system and the
evolution of the law. 187 The consistent application of erroneous law
propagates error and undermines the cherished practice of negotiating the
law among multiple jurists rather than allowing one judge to dictate it for
everyone. The JPML implicitly recognizes the importance of selecting the
right judge 188 and often “transfers complex cases to judges experienced in
handling complex and multidistrict litigation.”189 But the fact remains that
a single judge makes all of the important pretrial decisions for all the

183. See Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L.
REV. 469, 495 (1996) (expressing the concept in the context of “ambiguous criminal
statutes”).
184. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher & John Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme
Court’s Responsibilities: An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681, 716 (1984). As
Professors Estreicher and Sexton explained:
Disagreement in the lower courts facilitates percolation—the independent
evaluation of a legal issue by different courts. The process of percolation allows a
period of exploratory consideration and experimentation by lower courts before the
Supreme Court ends the process with a nationally binding rule. The Supreme
Court, when it decides a fully percolated issue, has the benefit of the experience of
those lower courts.
Id., quoted in California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 400 n.11 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
see also Moller, supra note 4, at 882 (“The [Supreme] Court has emphasized that
decentralized decision-making is an important component of our system of checks and
balances.”).
185. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
186. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 77, § 20.133 (“Although the
transferor judge has the power to vacate or modify rulings made by the transferee judge,
subject to comity and ‘law of the case’ considerations, doing so in the absence of a
significant change of circumstances would frustrate the purposes of centralized pretrial
proceedings.”); Bellevue Drug Co. v. CaremarksPCS, Inc. (In re Pharm. Benefit Managers
Antitrust Litig.), 582 F.3d 432, 441 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[W]e do not believe that Congress
intended that a ‘Return to Go’ card would be dealt to parties involved in MDL transfers.”);
see also, e.g., In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 467 F. Supp. 2d 256, 273–74 (E.D.N.Y.
2006) (court “to which an MDL case is transferred or remanded may revisit a transferee
court’s decision” in “exceptional cases”).
187. See, e.g., Moller, supra note 4, at 881 (“[T]he centralized framework of the MDL
process dampens the proposed due process scrutiny, creating incentives that run against the
grain of judicial review, if not defusing it altogether in many cases.”).
188. Sherman, supra note 7, at 2211 (“Perhaps the most critical decision the Panel has to
make is the selection of the judge to whom an MDL case is transferred.”).
189. Ostolaza & Hartmann, supra note 127, at 60 (citing In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine,
Fenfluramine, Dexfenfluramine) Prods. Liab. Litig., 990 F. Supp. 834, 836 (J.P.M.L. 1998));
see also, e.g., In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 1098, 1101
(J.P.M.L. 1992).
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consolidated cases. The rulings may be consistent across all the cases,190
but the virtue of consistency has its limits (as Ralph Waldo Emerson’s
famous words remind us). 191
Of course, the consolidated judicial power does not require the parties to
settle. But the alternative to settlement—taking a case to trial and getting
an appealable final judgment—is typically not viable. 192 By definition,
trials always involve significant expense of money and time. 193 These are
costs we impose on litigants who choose not to settle, and they are rarely
perceived as a basis for immediate appeal.194 But a trial in an MDL
proceeding—even of just one of the consolidated cases—can have
consequences far more devastating than the litigation expenses, especially if
conducted according to an erroneous construction of the applicable law.
One trial result often serves as a bellwether for all of the aggregated
cases. 195 A defense verdict or an award of trivial damages can doom all of
the plaintiffs’ claims, and the extrapolated results of a large plaintiff’s
verdict, like a plaintiff’s verdict in a class action, can be ruinous to the
defendants. 196 That extraordinary impact of a single trial result is
190. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
191. See Ralph Waldo Emerson, Self-Reliance (1841), in, e.g., THE SELECTED WRITINGS
OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON 132, 138 (Brooks Atkinson ed., 1992) (“A foolish consistency is
the hobgoblin of little minds . . . .”). The danger of consistency in the legal context is that it
can lull us into a sense of complacency. For example, one student commentator has
suggested that the uniformity of rulings in an MDL proceeding has the effect of “reducing
[the] need to pursue certain interlocutory appeals or motions to reconsider.” Oakley, supra
note 7, at 507. My thesis, of course, is the opposite—that the centralization of power in a
single judge makes it all the more prudent to facilitate interlocutory appellate review. See
also KOMESAR, supra note 14, at 145 (“[S]pecialization increases the potential for the bias
associated with substituting ‘expert’ judges for ‘general’ judges.”).
192. See Steinman, supra note 15, at 1240 (“[T]here has been a steep decrease in trials
resulting in appealable final judgments.”).
193. See id.; see also Davidson, supra note 10, at 195 (lamenting “the cost and
unnecessary waste of resources associated with bringing the case to trial when the district
court should have terminated the litigation at the summary judgment stage”); Redish, supra
note 25, at 98 (erroneous pretrial ruling “may require the parties to expend substantial
physical, financial and emotional effort in the preparation and conduct of a trial which may
later prove to have been worthless”); Solimine, supra note 33, at 1176 (“[A]n incorrect
decision may prolong a case and cause the litigants unnecessary cost and delay in resolving
their dispute” and “may cause a party considerable economic or legal uncertainty while a
case proceeds to trial or otherwise terminates in a final judgment.”).
194. See, e.g., Federal Civil Appellate Jurisdiction: An Interlocutory Restatement, LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1984, at 13, 190 (“Even though . . . a reversal of the order on
immediate appeal would dispense with a time-consuming and costly trial, the policy against
piecemeal litigation prevails.”); Martineau, supra note 26, at 742 (“[T]he trouble and
expense of litigation, even if the litigation is held to be ultimately unnecessary, are not to be
taken into consideration in deciding whether an order qualifies as collateral and thus
appealable.”); Waters, supra note 9, at 567 (“[C]ourts may not consider the added delay or
expense of unnecessary litigation in determining whether a ruling qualifies for collateral
order treatment.”); see also supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text.
195. See, e.g., Fallon, Grabill & Wynne, supra note 152, at 2340–41 (“bellwether trial
process” provides “a ‘once-in-a-lifetime’ opportunity for the resolution of mass disputes”);
Alexandra D. Lahav, Bellwether Trials, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 576, 581 (2008) (“[T]he
results of the bellwether trials will be extrapolated to the remaining plaintiffs.”).
196. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f), advisory committee’s note (1998 amendment) (“An order
granting certification . . . may force a defendant to settle rather than incur the costs of
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particularly troubling when the underlying legal rulings are questionable
and have never been reviewed by anyone other than the judge who rendered
them.
Even a party that can bear the risk of trial and musters up the fortitude to
try a case to final judgment loses the full value of an appeal by having to
wait. For one thing, the fortitude may dissolve once an adverse verdict
occurs. 197 But even a stalwart verdict-loser, undeterred by the trial loss and
game for the appellate process, would find the appellate court less receptive
to overturning the erroneous legal ruling precisely to avoid expending
additional judicial resources on a retrial.198 “[E]ven very doubtful trialcourt rulings that would not have survived interlocutory review are much
more likely to be upheld at this late stage.”199 The dynamic is more
pronounced in the MDL context, because appellate courts tend to regard the
trial judge as the expert.200 In short, the very same policy that the Supreme
Court has lauded in describing the final-judgment rule—the desire to avoid
the “oppressive expenses” of “successive appeals” 201—becomes an obstacle
in securing fair appellate review after final judgment. 202
The likely result is a settlement at a price that reflects a trial court’s
mistaken articulation of the governing law, perhaps adjusted slightly to
reflect the potential for reversal on appeal that will never come. So a
defendant, aggrieved by an erroneous legal ruling, will pay more to settle,
because the prospect of trial is even worse. A similarly aggrieved plaintiff
will take less. And the implications of this mispriced settlement go beyond
the immediate financial impact to the parties; the mispricing remains a
lingering anathema to the legal system’s role in encouraging or
discouraging certain behaviors through economic models. 203 Although
defending a class action and run the risk of potentially ruinous liability.”); Coopers &
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 476 (1978) (recognizing that “[c]ertification of a large
class may so increase the defendant’s potential damages liability and litigation costs that he
may find it economically prudent to settle and to abandon a meritorious defense”); see also
Michael E. Solimine & Christine Oliver Hines, Deciding To Decide: Class Action
Certification and Interlocutory Review by the United States Courts of Appeals Under Rule
23(f), 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1531, 1567 (2000) (citing Proposed Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 167 F.R.D. 559, 565 (1996))).
197. See In re Chevron USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1016, 1022 (5th Cir. 1997) (Jones, J.,
concurring).
198. See Cooper, supra note 29, at 160 (“[T]here are great risks . . . that affirmance will
blink at serious error in order to avoid” the cost of a retrial.).
199. Waters, supra note 9, at 552; see also id. at 565 (courts of appeals have “every
incentive to affirm all but the grossest trial court errors” when a mass-tort case gets to final
judgment); Dalton, supra note 19, at 80 (“[R]eversals are more likely . . . where retrial would
be easy, inexpensive, or unnecessary.”).
200. See, e.g., Moller, supra note 4, at 879.
201. E.g., Canter v. Am. Ins. Co., 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 307, 318 (1830) (Story, J.).
202. This is not to say that appellate courts will never reverse a judgment rendered after
trial in an MDL case. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit recently ordered a new trial in an MDL case
that the trial judge had selected as a bellwether. See Tamraz v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 620 F.3d
665 (6th Cir. 2010). But such reversals appear rare. And the Tamraz case illustrates the
tremendous waste of resources that could have been avoided—and the true purpose of a
bellwether case enhanced—if appellate review had been available before trial.
203. See generally POSNER, supra note 120, § 21.2, at 594–95.
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they may be willing to resolve a particular dispute on unfavorable terms, the
parties are left unsure of their legal obligations going forward,204 and their
“freedom to plan . . . future conduct” is diminished as a result. 205 To the
extent we rely on the allocation of legal liabilities to influence behavior, we
either lose that benefit or skew the analysis by failing to offer MDL litigants
a means of correcting a trial judge’s error of law before settlement.
2. The Unavailability of Interlocutory Review from Important Legal
Rulings in MDL Proceedings
The dynamic in the similar context of class actions has led a number of
judges and commentators to use the pejorative term “blackmail” in
describing a trial judge’s power in consolidated cases to force a settlement
through adverse pretrial rulings. Perhaps the most famous example is Judge
Richard Posner’s opinion in In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 206 in which
he observed that “Judge Friendly, who was not given to hyperbole, called
settlements induced by a small probability of an immense judgment in a
class action ‘blackmail settlements.’”207 The “blackmail charge” was
influential in the promulgation of a rule authorizing interlocutory appellate
review of certification orders under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(f). 208
But the “blackmail charge” had no impact on the right of appellate
review under § 1407. 209 Despite the growth in MDL cases and the resulting
204. See Moller, supra note 4, at 857.
205. Id. at 871; see also Redish, supra note 25, at 98–99 (An actor is left in a “cloud of
uncertainty surrounding the financial soundness of his business or the legality of his
practices.”); Solimine, supra note 33, at 1181 (“[C]ertainty as to the procedural or
substantive law will lead to more settlements than not. . . . [P]arties probably go into most
litigation expecting the law to be fairly certain or to be made more certain by the judiciary.”).
206. 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
207. Id. at 1298 (quoting HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW
120 (1973)); see also Allan Kanner & Tibor Nagy, Exploding the Blackmail Myth: A New
Perspective on Class Action Settlements, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 681, 682 (2005) (“[A] number
of federal courts have held that aggregating numerous claims into one class action suit puts
excessive settlement pressure on defendants, and renders class certification tantamount to
blackmail.”); Waters, supra note 9, at 582 (“[T]he court [in Rhone-Poulenc] addressed the
‘economic blackmail’ problem that often confronts defendants in mass tort class actions.”).
208. Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357, 1358 (2003); see also supra notes 80–85 and accompanying text.
209. The “blackmail charge” also has not resulted in an expansion of the right of
interlocutory review from the substantive legal decisions rendered in class actions. One
could thus argue that my proposal to expand mandatory interlocutory appellate jurisdiction
in the MDL context should also apply to similar kinds of orders entered in certified class
actions, where there is a similar aggregation concern. I do not necessarily quarrel with that
suggestion, but I do not believe the need is as compelling, for several reasons. First, a
substantial number of class actions would benefit from my proposed expansion of MDL
appellate jurisdiction, because they are already part of MDL proceedings. See, e.g., Judith
Resnik, Aggregation, Settlement, and Dismay, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 918, 929 (1995). That
should come as no surprise, considering that competing class actions by definition raise
identical claims that are obvious candidates for MDL consolidation. Second, to the extent
that competing class actions are not part of an MDL, the legal rulings are not centralized in a
single judge, so there remains some measure of horizontal scrutiny that we do not see in the
MDL setting. See supra notes 183–91 and accompanying text. Finally, Rule 23(f), though
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increase in the power consolidated in individual district court judges, the
MDL system has no built-in mechanism for scrutiny of any kind—even of
rulings that are fairly debatable, novel, or outright wrong—until after a case
reaches final judgment. A party seeking to obtain review of an
interlocutory MDL decision must rely on the categories of interlocutory
appellate jurisdiction that exist for all other cases. As a result, and as
Professor Waters has observed, “appellate courts never effectively review
many of the most controversial rulings and innovations of mass tort trial
judges.” 210 I now provide a palpable example of an MDL in which the trial
court has made several such controversial rulings and innovations that have
evaded appellate review.
3. A Case Study: The Effects of MDL Power Centralization in the MTBE
Litigation
In 2000, the JPML created a new MDL proceeding for product-liability
claims involving MTBE, a gasoline oxygenate.211 The cases were
consolidated before Judge Shira A. Scheindlin 212 in the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District New York. 213 The plaintiffs are private
landowners and public and private water providers. 214 They allege that
MTBE, found in gasoline that has leaked or spilled, has contaminated or
threatens to contaminate the groundwater in their water wells.215 The
defendants include over fifty gasoline refiners, distributors, and retailers
from fifteen different states. 216 As of January 2011, a total of 178 MTBE

not a vehicle for a direct attack on a district court’s substantive legal rulings in class actions,
at least provides an established mechanism for some degree of immediate appellate review
(albeit discretionary) from interlocutory orders rendered in class actions and has often served
as a successful tool for pretrial appellate guidance. See, e.g., Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
603 F.3d 571, 628 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming class certification), cert. granted in part, 79
U.S.L.W. 3342 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2010) (No. 10-277). The decision to transfer a case to an
MDL, by contrast, is reviewable only if a party can convince an appellate court to entertain
the extraordinary remedy of mandamus. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(e) (2006); see also supra
notes 94–95 and accompanying text.
210. Waters, supra note 9, at 530–31.
211. In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1358, 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14901 (J.P.M.L. Oct. 10, 2000).
212. Judge Shira A. Scheindlin is perhaps best known for her groundbreaking decisions
governing the allocation of costs to conduct discovery of electronically stored information.
See, e.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). Before
becoming a district judge, she served as a magistrate judge in the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of New York, where she worked closely with Judge Weinstein on the Agent
Orange MDL. See, e.g., In re “Agent Orange” Prods. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 752
(E.D.N.Y. 1984).
213. In re MTBE, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14901, at *4.
214. In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 348,
364 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
215. See id.
216. See id. at 362, 364, 382.
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cases, originally filed in nineteen different states,217 had been consolidated
before Judge Scheindlin. 218
The underlying factual allegations of the lawsuits relate to MTBE’s use
as a gasoline oxygenate. In the 1990s, in response to legislation amending
the Clean Air Act, 219 gasoline refiners began widely using MTBE to meet
federal regulatory standards for minimizing air pollution from automobile
emissions. 220 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had
approved MTBE as one of several oxygenates that refiners could use to
meet the new standards; ethanol was another.221
The plaintiffs allege that MTBE has reached or will reach their water
sources because gasoline containing MTBE has leaked or spilled into the
ground. They claim that MTBE in the water supply has caused taste and
odor problems and raised health concerns. 222 The alleged damages range in
amounts, depending on the number and size of the plaintiffs’ water wells
and the extent of alleged contamination. Several of the plaintiffs have
sought tens or hundreds of millions of dollars in compensatory damages.223
Simple math establishes the astronomical size of the aggregate potential
liability when the alleged damages are multiplied by the number of
consolidated cases. And the plaintiffs also seek to recover punitive
damages based on allegations that the defendants misled the public about
MTBE’s properties. 224
Both the facts and the law in MTBE cases are complex. 225 And all of the
complex legal questions—“virtually every substantive and procedural
217. Cnty. of Suffolk v. Amerada Hess Corp. (In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE)
Prods. Liab. Litig.), 510 F. Supp. 2d 299, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
218. See U.S. JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., DISTRIBUTION OF PENDING MDL
DOCKETS (As of Jan. 11, 2011) 9, available at http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/
Pending_MDL_Dockets-January-2011.pdf. (Note that as the JPML updates its statistics, it
replaces prior versions of its pending distribution summaries with updated versions.)
219. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 219, 104 Stat. 2399,
2492–2500 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7545 (2006)). The statute was subsequently
amended again in 2005. See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1504, 119
Stat. 594, 1076–80 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
220. California v. Atl. Richfield Co. (In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods.
Liab. Litig.), 488 F.3d 112, 114 (2d Cir. 2007).
221. See id. (“Pursuant to regulations promulgated by the [EPA] in 1991, MTBE is one of
several different oxygenates that may be used to certify gasoline as reformulated.”).
222. Id. at 114–15.
223. See, e.g., City of New York v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl
Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig.), Nos. 00 Civ. 1898 (SAS), 04 Civ. 3417 (SAS), 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 47135, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2010) (describing single plaintiff’s $104
million verdict against single defendant for subset of allegedly contaminated wells); In re
Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., 578 F. Supp. 2d 519, 520
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (describing $422 million cash portion of partial settlement of fifty-nine
plaintiffs’ claims).
224. See, e.g., City of New York v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl
Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig.), Nos. 00 Civ. 1898 (SAS), 04 Civ. 3417 (SAS), 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 96469 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2009) (holding evidence in one particular case
insufficient to warrant jury consideration of punitive damages).
225. Cnty. of Suffolk v. Amerada Hess Corp. (In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE)
Prods. Liab. Litig.), 510 F. Supp. 2d 299, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (noting that MTBE cases
raise “complex issues of state law”).
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issue” that has come up in the focus cases—have been decided by a single
district court judge.226 By 2007 that single judge had “issued thirty-six
substantive opinions and orders, comprising more than one thousand pages
of text . . . .” 227 Many of the court’s interlocutory decisions “resolved
disputed issues of state law.” 228
The absence of immediate appellate review has been particularly
significant for three of the district court’s decisions. All three decisions left
significant room for debate about what the law is (or should be). And the
decisions had “serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence[s]” for the
litigants, the course of the litigation, and the choice between settling and
proceeding to trial. I explain each of them in turn.
a. Three Questionable Rulings in the MTBE MDL Proceedings
i. The Holding That Plaintiffs’ State-Law Claims Were Not Barred by
Conflict Preemption
Conflict preemption is a defense that applies “where state law ‘stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.’” 229 In the MTBE context, the defense springs
from the federal requirement to reduce gasoline air emissions through a
choice of approved oxygenates, including MTBE. The Supreme Court has
held that when federal law permits a range of choices, states may not
regulate or impose tort liability in a way that restricts those federally
approved choices. 230
The defendants have argued that tort liability for using MTBE would
interfere with the EPA regulations permitting them to use a choice of
oxygenates, including MTBE. 231 The MTBE court has repeatedly rejected
this argument. 232 In doing so, the court ignored Congress’s express
delegation to the EPA the responsibility of approving oxygenates to meet
the statutory emission-reduction standards, “taking into consideration the
cost of achieving such emission reductions, any nonair-quality and other
air-quality related health and environmental impacts and energy
226. Id. at 330.
227. Id. at 301.
228. Id. at 301 n.8 (citations omitted); see also In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE)
Prods. Liab. Litig., 457 F. Supp. 2d 324, 326 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (listing numerous
opinions).
229. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995) (quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
230. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (tort liability); Fid. Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass’n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982) (regulatory restrictions).
231. See supra notes 219–20 and accompanying text.
232. See City of New York v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether
(MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig.), Nos. 00 Civ. 1898 (SAS), 04 Civ. 3417 (SAS), 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 92744, at *52–53 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2010) (denying post-trial motion for judgment
as a matter of law); In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., 457
F. Supp. 2d 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (denying motion for summary judgment); In re Methyl
Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., 175 F. Supp. 2d 593, 614–16 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (denying motion to dismiss under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)).
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requirements.” 233 And the court dismissed as speculative the defendants’
argument that imposition of tort liability against any of the various
approved oxygenates (MTBE in this case, ethanol in the next) could leave
the defendants with no viable options for meeting federal clean-air
requirements 234—even while acknowledging that “[p]ermitting the City’s
state tort claims to proceed [under these circumstances] may seem
unfair.” 235
Conflict preemption, by its nature, is dispositive of state-law claims. But
the district court refused to certify its pretrial preemption decisions for
immediate review under § 1292(b). The court noted its “‘unfettered
discretion to deny certification’” 236 and found no “substantial ground for
difference of opinion.” 237 The latter holding is particularly startling—not
only because of the potential flaws in the court’s reasoning, but also
because “courts are split” on “the preemption of claims to remedy MTBE
contamination.” 238
ii. The Creation of a New Causation Theory: Commingled-Product Market
Share
Perhaps the most vigorously contested state-law question in the MTBE
litigation has been causation, which stems from “the problem of product
identification.” 239 In response to the plaintiffs’ difficulties in establishing
causation, the court “fashion[ed] a new collective liability” theory, 240 which
the court named the “‘commingled product theory’ of market share
liability.” 241 No state had ever recognized or endorsed this theory; it was
the court’s own creation, and it has evolved considerably over time even
within the MTBE litigation. Despite its novelty, its malleability, and the
reasonable possibility that states would not extend their laws to recognize it,
no other court—state or federal, trial or appellate—has had occasion to
review it. Yet it remains the law governing the vast majority of the actions
consolidated in the MTBE MDL.
The genesis of the theory is the proposition that plaintiffs would be
unable to establish liability without a relaxation of traditional causation

233. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k)(1) (2006).
234. In re MTBE, 457 F. Supp. 2d at 343.
235. In re MTBE, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92744, at *52–53.
236. In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., 174 F. Supp. 2d 4, 7
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting Nat’l Asbestos Workers Med. Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 71 F.
Supp. 2d 139, 162 (E.D.N.Y. 1999)).
237. Id. at 8.
238. See Carrie L. Williamson, “But You Said We Could Do It!”: Oil Companies’
Liability for the Unintended Consequence of MTBE Water Contamination, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q.
315, 326 (2002).
239. In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 348,
362 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
240. M. Stuart Madden & Jamie Holian, Defendant Indeterminacy: New Wine into Old
Skins, 67 LA. L. REV. 785, 816 (2007).
241. In re MTBE, 379 F. Supp. 2d at 377.

2011] APPELLATE REVIEW IN MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION

1679

principles. 242 The physical properties of MTBE and the nature of the
gasoline distribution system make it impossible to identify the manufacturer
of the gasoline that may have reached to a particular contamination site.243
But the court gleaned from the case law that “from time to time courts have
fashioned new approaches in order to permit plaintiffs to pursue a recovery
when the facts and circumstances of their actions raised unforeseen barriers
to relief.” 244
After identifying “the need for one more theory,” and using first-person
language emphasizing its role in developing new law, 245 the court held:
When a plaintiff can prove that certain gaseous or liquid products (e.g.,
gasoline, liquid propane, alcohol) of many suppliers were present in a
completely commingled or blended state at the time and place that the risk
of harm occurred, and the commingled product caused a single indivisible
injury, then each of the products should be deemed to have caused the
harm. 246

To determine each defendant’s several share of liability, the court would
look to its “share of the market at the time of the injury.” 247
The commingled-product theory departs from existing law, in which
“identification of the exact defendant whose product injured the plaintiff
is . . . generally required.” 248 Judge Jack Weinstein had rejected a similar
commingled-product theory in an earlier MDL. 249 And the MTBE court
acknowledged that the recognition of the new theory of state tort law was “a
policy decision” that raised important federalism concerns.250
242. E.g., Cesar Pereira, Comment, Protecting the “Underground Seas”: A Case for
Protecting and Creating Claims Against Oil Companies for Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether
(MTBE) Groundwater Contamination, 12 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 15 (2004) (“[P]laintiffs
suing MTBE manufacturers under a claim of negligence may have a hard time establishing
causation.”).
243. In re MTBE, 379 F. Supp. 2d at 362.
244. Id. at 377 (emphasis added); see also Cnty. of Suffolk v. Amerada Hess Corp. (In re
Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig.), 447 F. Supp. 2d 289, 301
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (same).
245. In re MTBE, 379 F. Supp. 2d at 377 (“I shall now describe what I call the
‘commingled product theory’ of market share liability.”); see also City of New York v.
Exxon Mobil Corp. (In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig.), Nos. 00
Civ. 1898 (SAS), 04 Civ. 3417 (SAS), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92744, at *40 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
7, 2010) (“[I]n order to protect the interests of plaintiffs in this MDL while fairly
apportioning liability, I have developed the commingled product theory of liability.”
(emphasis added)).
246. In re MTBE, 379 F. Supp. 2d at 377–78; see also In re MTBE, 447 F. Supp. 2d at
301 (same); Cnty. of Suffolk v. Amerada Hess Corp. (In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether
(MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig.), 591 F. Supp. 2d 249, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (same); Madden &
Holian, supra note 240, at 816–21 (summarizing commingled-product theory).
247. In re MTBE, 447 F. Supp. 2d at 301.
248. Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1073 (N.Y. 1989).
249. See In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1263 (E.D.N.Y.
1985) (dismissing claims in part because plaintiffs failed to prove “that any particular
defendant produced the Agent Orange to which he may have been exposed” and noting that
“[n]o case has ever permitted recovery in such a situation”), aff’d, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir.
1987).
250. In re MTBE, 447 F. Supp. 2d at 301; In re MTBE, 379 F. Supp. 2d at 369–70; see
also Johnstown v. Bankers Standard Ins. Co., 877 F.2d 1146, 1153 (2d Cir. 1989)
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The MTBE court has also acknowledged that the new theory has
engendered “much confusion,” 251 that it “has been difficult to describe,” 252
and that the court “has described the commingled theory in different ways
over the years.” 253 The inconsistencies have involved both the reasonable
inferences that a jury could draw from the plaintiffs’ evidence of a
commingled gasoline distribution system254 and the predicate showing that
a plaintiff would have to make in order to resort to the commingled-product
theory in the first place. 255 The court has dismissed the inconsistencies as
“not important.” 256
Given the novelty of the theory and the court’s own difficulty in
articulating it consistently, one might expect that the court would have
appreciated and encouraged the participation of other judges before
imposing the theory on hundreds of parties in an MDL proceeding
involving the laws of multiple states. 257 But that is not what happened.
Instead, the district court twice rejected the defendants’ request for
certification under § 1292(b). 258 It did so even though the focus cases have
been New York cases, 259 and certification under § 1292(b) would have

(admonishing federal courts “not to adopt innovative theories that may distort established
state law”); Barry Friedman, Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases
Between Federal and State Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1211, 1239 (2004) (noting “general
preference for resolving novel state law questions in state court”).
251. In re MTBE, 591 F. Supp. 2d at 267.
252. City of New York v. Amerada Hess Corp. (In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether
(MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig.), 644 F. Supp. 2d 310, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
253. Id. at 318.
254. Compare In re MTBE, 591 F. Supp. 2d at 273 (“[N]o reasonable jury could find, by
a preponderance of the evidence, that each defendant’s gasoline caused the contamination of
each well.”), with id. at 275 (“A reasonable jury could conclude that each defendant’s
gasoline was present within the well’s capture zone even if the jury concludes that it cannot
identify the source of the spill that caused the well’s contamination.”).
255. Compare Cnty. of Suffolk v. Amerada Hess Corp. (In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether
(MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig.), 447 F. Supp. 2d 289, 304–05 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“If there is an
identifiable defendant (or defendants) and plaintiffs can obtain a make-whole remedy from
those parties, then there is no need to turn to an alternative theory of liability to pursue other
possible tortfeasors.”), with In re MTBE, 591 F. Supp. 2d at 276 (“I have previously stated
that alternative liability theories . . . should not be applied unless plaintiffs have no other
remedy. . . . I now conclude that plaintiffs may pursue product liability or negligence claims
against manufacturers . . . regardless of whether plaintiffs can identify a retailer whose
leaking tank spilled gasoline into a well’s capture zone.”).
256. See In re MTBE, 644 F. Supp. 2d at 318.
257. See Waters, supra note 9, at 553 (“If dramatic innovations in procedural and
substantive law are to take place as a result of the mass tort regime, mass tort trial judges,
specialists though they may be, must be able to look to the appellate courts for guidance as to
the appropriate limits of such innovation.”).
258. See Cnty. of Suffolk v. Amerada Hess Corp. (In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether
(MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig.), Nos. 1:00-1898, MDL 1358, M 21-88, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
47222, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2008); In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods.
Liab. Litig., 399 F. Supp. 2d 320, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
259. See City of New York v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether
(MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig.), Nos. 00 MDL 1898 (SAS), 04 Civ. 3417 (SAS), 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 34471, at *4 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2010); Cnty. of Suffolk v. Amerada Hess
Corp. (In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig.), 510 F. Supp. 2d 299,
301 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
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enabled the Second Circuit to certify the novel state-law issue to New
York’s highest court. 260 Remarkably, the court concluded that there was no
“substantial ground for difference of opinion.” 261
iii. The Retention of Jurisdiction After the Supreme Court Rejected
Federal-Officer Removal
The MTBE court’s debatable rulings on issues of substantive law warrant
even greater scrutiny in light of the court’s questionable jurisdiction over
some of the cases consolidated within the MDL proceedings.
The jurisdictional defect stemmed from developments in the law under
the federal-officer removal statute.262 The defendants in the MTBE cases
removed several actions to federal court, alleging that they had added
MTBE to gasoline “at the direction of the EPA” and that the federal court
had jurisdiction over any related civil claims. 263 The court denied the
plaintiffs’ motion to remand, finding that the defendants’ removal
allegations were sufficient to establish federal-officer jurisdiction. 264 It
then denied the plaintiffs’ request for interlocutory-appeal certification
under § 1292(b), finding, among other things, “no substantial ground for a
difference of opinion with respect to the Court’s jurisdictional analysis.” 265
Later developments confirmed that there was substantial ground. In
2007, the Second Circuit held that federal-officer removal was not
appropriate in the MTBE cases. 266 That holding ostensibly required the
district court to remand the cases removed on the basis of federal-officer
jurisdiction. 267 But the district court refused to remand. It retained
jurisdiction on the strength of a federal claim, under the citizen-suit

260. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 500.27(a) (2008) (New York Court of
Appeals accepts certified questions only from “the Supreme Court of the United States, any
United States Court of Appeals, or a court of last resort of any other state”); see also Cnty. of
Westchester v. Comm’r of Transp., 9 F.3d 242, 245 (2d Cir. 1993) (suggesting that a district
court confronted with a novel issue of state law should certify an appeal under § 1292(b) so
that the state-law issue can “in turn be certified” to the Connecticut Supreme Court).
261. See In re MTBE, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47222, at *10–15.
262. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (2006) (providing for removal to federal court of any case
against “[t]he United States or any agency thereof or any officer (or any person acting under
that officer) of the United States or of any agency thereof, sued in an official or individual
capacity for any act under color of such office . . . .”).
263. In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., 342 F. Supp. 2d 147,
156 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
264. Id. at 159.
265. Orange Cnty. Water Dist. v. Unocal Corp. (In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether
(MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig.), Nos. 1:00-1898, MDL 1358 (SAS), M 21-88, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 225, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2005).
266. California v. Atl. Richfield Co. (In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods.
Liab. Litig.), 488 F.3d 112, 124–32 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Watson v. Philip Morris Cos.,
551 U.S. 142, 153 (2007) (“[A] highly regulated firm cannot find a statutory basis for
removal in the fact of federal regulation alone.”).
267. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2006) (“If at any time before final judgment it appears that
the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”).
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provision of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 268 that the
plaintiffs had added by way of amendment after removal.269
Pinning jurisdiction on that post-removal event ran counter to established
law holding that subject-matter jurisdiction “‘depends upon the state of
things at the time of the action brought.’”270 The district court nevertheless
concluded that it could exercise jurisdiction because it “believed that [it]
had jurisdiction” when it permitted the plaintiffs to add the TSCA claim271
and because the TSCA amendment was “intended to solidify the court’s
jurisdiction” rather than destroy jurisdiction.272 Neither justification for
refusing to remand was supported by the case law; the Supreme Court had
recently reemphasized a bright-line “time-of-filing rule” whether
“destruction or perfection of jurisdiction is at issue.” 273
Ultimately, the court’s refusal to remand seemed most influenced by its
concerns with “finality, efficiency and economy” 274 and its distaste for a
result that “would ignore the years of effort by the Court and the parties.”275
But this exception ignored the Supreme Court’s express rejection of “an
approach to jurisdiction that focuses on efficiency and judicial economy”276
and its reaffirmation of “the time-of-filing rule regardless of the costs it
imposes.” 277
Given the district court’s unsupported bases for retaining jurisdiction in a
case that it acknowledged was “sui generis,” 278 one might have expected
(or hoped) that the Second Circuit would entertain a request for mandamus
relief. 279 But the Second Circuit refused the defendant’s request for
mandamus, finding no “exceptional circumstances.” 280 As a result, the
improperly removed cases remained (and those that did not settle281 still
remain) in the same district court that has rendered debatable substantive
decisions on both federal and state law. Ironically, had the case returned to
New York state court, the substantive rulings may themselves have been
subject to interlocutory appeal 282—and we would know with certainty, for
268. 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (2006).
269. See Cnty. of Suffolk v. Amerada Hess Corp. (In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether
(MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig.), 510 F. Supp. 2d 299, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
270. Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 570 (2004) (quoting
Mollan v. Torrance, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 537, 539 (1824)).
271. See In re MTBE, 510 F. Supp. 2d at 306 n.31 (emphasis added).
272. Id. at 307 (citing Chabner v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 225 F.3d 1042, 1046 n.3
(9th Cir. 2000)).
273. Grupo Dataflux, 541 U.S. at 580–81.
274. In re MTBE, 510 F. Supp. 2d at 307.
275. Id. at 319.
276. See Grupo Dataflux, 541 U.S. at 577.
277. Id. at 571.
278. In re MTBE, 510 F. Supp. 2d at 305–06.
279. See, e.g., Waters, supra note 9, at 591–93 (advocating expansion of resort to writs of
mandamus).
280. Order, In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 07-4290,
07-4308, at 2 (2d Cir. Nov. 16, 2007).
281. See infra notes 283–84 and accompanying text.
282. See ROBERT J. MARTINEAU, MODERN APPELLATE PRACTICE: FEDERAL AND STATE
CIVIL APPEALS § 4.12 (1983) (“New York places virtually no restrictions on the right to
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example, whether the New York cases are to be governed by the federal
district court’s newly fashioned commingled-product theory.
b. The Impact of Insulating the MTBE Rulings from Interlocutory Review
The denial of interlocutory appellate review in the MTBE cases has
insulated the trial court from any meaningful scrutiny of decisions that have
the potential to redistribute billions of dollars. The right to appeal would
potentially have tempered the court’s inclination to depart from or to extend
existing law. But the unsuccessful attempts to appeal seem to have had the
opposite effect. In denying a request for § 1292(b) certification from one of
its decisions relating to its commingled-product theory, the court chastised
the defendants for “seeking interlocutory appeal . . . three times in less than
one year.” 283
Measuring the precise economic impact of the district court’s unbridled
power is difficult, because we do not know what would have occurred if the
appellate court had been willing to review even one of these rulings. We
know, though, that shortly after the failed attempts to appeal, all of the
defendants ultimately settled for hundreds of millions of dollars with one
group of plaintiffs, including the plaintiffs in one of the early New York
focus cases. 284 Another group of plaintiffs also settled with most of the
defendants, leaving only one defendant willing to go to trial.285 It stands to
reason that the cost of these settlements was higher as a result of the district
court’s rulings and the inability to obtain immediate appellate review.
Indeed, appellate review might have established that the defendants had no
liability at all. But the option of going to trial and seeking to correct the
legal error after final judgment was obviously even more unpalatable. 286 In
the lone case that so far has proceeded to trial against the only non-settling
defendant, a single plaintiff pursued only a portion of its alleged
damages 287 and won a compensatory verdict of over a hundred million
dollars. 288 Most defendants would be unwilling or unable to withstand that

appeal.”); see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5701(a) & (a)(2)(iv) (McKinney Supp. 2010) (listing broad
categories of appeals available “as of right” in New York state courts, including orders that
“involve[] some part of the merits”).
283. Cnty. of Suffolk v. Amerada Hess Corp. (In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE)
Prods. Liab. Litig.), Nos. 1:00-1898, MDL 1358 (SAS), M 21-88, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
47222, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2008).
284. See In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., 578 F. Supp. 2d
519, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
285. See City of New York v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether
(MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig.), Nos. 00 Civ. 1898 (SAS), 04 Civ. 3417 (SAS), 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 47135, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2010) (noting that trial proceeded against Exxon
Mobil entities, as they were “the only remaining defendants in this case”).
286. See supra notes 192–96 and accompanying text.
287. See City of New York v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether
(MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig.), Nos. 00 MDL 1898 (SAS), 04 Civ. 3417 (SAS), 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 34471, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2010) (“In preparation for trial, five focus wells,
among the dozens at issue in this case, were selected.”).
288. See In re MTBE, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47135, at *3.
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kind of verdict. Yet it has become the purchase price for the right of
appeal.
Is the MTBE example sufficiently representative? To answer that
question would require a detailed analysis of the important legal rulings
rendered in a statistically significant number of MDL cases, and I have not
undertaken that examination. Certainly, however, there is other anecdotal
evidence, both in the recent case law 289 and in commentary, 290 to suggest
that the appellate courthouse doors are frequently closed in the face of MDL
litigants trying mightily to break them down. And, at bottom, the more
infrequently an MDL gives rise to the need for immediate appeal, the
smaller the burden an expanded pathway to appeal would impose on the
courts. In other words, a new avenue for mandatory appeal is justified
regardless of how frequently a litigant may legitimately invoke it.
For those who view any settlement as the highest and best objective, then
perhaps the MTBE cases show that the existing system is satisfactory. But
if we want parties to settle only if the settlement reflects the true value of
the claims; if we want tort liability to serve its utilitarian purpose in
adjusting parties’ behaviors in the marketplace; 291 and if we want to ensure
that any evolution of our common law takes place with the benefit of
consideration by multiple judges (and not just one), 292 then the existing
MDL system is inadequate. As Professor Waters writes, “the appellate
courts will have very little influence” over the evolution of substantive law
in mass-tort cases “unless they change their approach to interlocutory
appellate review.” 293
289. See In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d 201, 226 (3d Cir. 2006) (rejecting petition for writ of
mandamus in case involving federal court’s refusal to remand cases to state court); In re Diet
Drugs (Phentermine/Fenfluramine/Dexfenfluramine) Prods. Liab. Litig., 401 F.3d 143, 145
(3d Cir. 2005) (dismissing appeal from interim attorney-fee award); Adelphia Recovery
Trust v. Bank of Am., N.A., Nos. 05 Civ. 9050, 03 MDL 1529, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
50209, at *72–76 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2010) (denying § 1292(b) certification over order
dismissing claims for lack of standing); In re Bisphenol-A (BPA) Polycarbonate Plastic
Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1967, No. 08-1967-MD-W-ODS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3904, at *30–32 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 19, 2010) (denying § 1292(b) certification over order
specifying which categories of defendants had alleged cognizable damages related to use of
plastic baby bottles); Ntsebeza v. Daimler AG (In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig.), No. 02 MDL
1499 (SAS), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121559, at *10–11 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 31, 2009) (denying
§ 1292(b) certification over holding that Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006), applies
to corporations); Hood ex rel. Mississippi v. Eli Lilly & Co. (In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab.
Litig.), 671 F. Supp. 2d 397, 464 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (denying § 1292(b) certification over
order dismissing claims based on plaintiff’s attempted use of aggregate proof); In re Guidant
Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-1708 (DWF/AJB), 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56557, at *4–5 (D. Minn. July 1, 2009) (summarizing third-party
plaintiffs’ several unsuccessful attempts at interlocutory appeal over order dismissing claims
for lack of standing).
290. See supra note 182 (commentators discussing Judge Weinstein’s refusal to permit
interlocutory review of orders rendered in Agent Orange MDL).
291. See, e.g., supra notes 203–05 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 183–91 and accompanying text.
293. Waters, supra note 9, at 566; see also id. at 530 (“[M]ass tort trial judges are
creating, systematizing, and refining the [mass-tort] genre alone, without the guidance of
appellate courts.”); id. at 531 (“[A]ppellate courts lack the necessary tools to exercise their
proper role in supervising the development of the mass tort regime.”).

2011] APPELLATE REVIEW IN MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION

1685

III. THE SOLUTION: A LIMITED RIGHT OF APPEAL FROM INTERLOCUTORY
LEGAL RULINGS IN MDL CASES
To solve the problem, I propose a new category of mandatory appellate
jurisdiction over certain interlocutory orders entered in MDL proceedings.
Identifying the criteria is admittedly challenging, because they must be
articulated “broadly enough to capture the entire problem area, yet narrowly
enough not to impose an unmanageable additional burden on circuit
courts.” 294 But I believe these three criteria, similar in large measure to the
criteria of § 1292(b), strike the right balance: (1) the order must raise an
issue of law; (2) there must be no controlling law on point, or the district
court must have elected not to follow it; and (3) appellate review must be
potentially dispositive of a significant number of the cases consolidated in
the MDL proceeding. I elaborate below on each of the three criteria.295
A. Section 1292(b) Criteria Invigorated: Appeals of Right in MDL
Proceedings
1. An Issue of Pure Law
The first criterion under my proposal is the simplest and most familiar:
the interlocutory order in question must raise a question of pure law. This
criterion echoes the first criterion of § 1292(b) and one of the more salient
functions of Rule 23(f)—to permit appellate review of “important legal
issues that otherwise might prove elusive.” 296 These arise most commonly
from rulings on motions to dismiss and for summary judgment and involve
“a question of the meaning of a statutory or constitutional provision,
regulation, or common law doctrine.” 297
There are several reasons for requiring that the issue involve a legal
question. First, that limitation eliminates large categories of orders on
nonlegal questions that typically involve trial-court discretion, such as those
affecting docket management, discovery disputes, or trial procedure. While
legal rulings are reviewed de novo, discretionary rulings are reviewed under
the more deferential abuse-of-discretion standard and are therefore less
likely to be reversed. 298 Limiting interlocutory appeal to issues of law

294. Glynn, supra note 17, at 261.
295. There are certainly other possible vehicles for expanding the review currently
available from interlocutory trial court orders in MDL cases. One alternative approach, for
example, would be to bolster the MDL system with MDL appellate panels comprised of
other district court judges, similar to the bankruptcy appellate panels that Congress has
authorized. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2006). But the proposal I offer has the advantage of
operating within an existing judicial structure and avoiding the administrative burdens that
accompany new institutions.
296. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 1012, 1016 (7th
Cir. 2002).
297. Ahrenholz v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 219 F.3d 674, 676 (7th Cir. 2000).
298. See Paul R. Michel, Foreword: The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Must
Evolve To Meet the Challenges Ahead, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1177, 1192 (1999) (“In general,
the chances of reversal are much higher on an issue subject to de novo review than under any
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helps ensure that the court of appeals is called upon to examine only those
orders that require its exacting review.
That is not to say that some orders that are ultimately exercises of trialcourt discretion would categorically fail to qualify for immediate review. If
the trial court resolves a legal question in the course of ruling on a
discretionary matter, then the order in question may potentially fit the bill.
For example, a trial court may be required to articulate the governing law to
resolve a discovery dispute, and an appellate court would review de novo
the legal analysis underlying that decision. 299 In general, however, the
issue-of-law requirement would protect against an onslaught of
questionable appeals from the numerous instances in which trial courts are
called upon to exercise their discretion.300
Limiting interlocutory review to legal issues also ensures that
interlocutory appeals will have the most direct impact on the parties’
assessments of potential litigation outcomes. Such review would assist the
parties in evaluating and accurately pricing settlement, thus stabilizing the
economic impact of the mass tort and better reflecting the costs that a
tortfeasor should bear for having caused the alleged injuries. By contrast,
most nonlegal rulings are unlikely to influence the parties’ assessments of
their overall risks.
Beyond the parties, requiring appellate courts to participate more actively
in articulating the governing law would temper the outsized influence that
MDL judges have over the evolution of legal theories. In the current
system, the pressure to settle before trial all but ensures that a case never
reaches final judgment—and, thus, rarely reaches the court of appeals. A
single MDL judge’s articulation of the law in essence becomes the law,
with no review or input from other judges. But an immediate appeal before
settlement would decentralize that power and ensure that difficult legal
questions enjoy a full measure of judicial consideration.
It also bears mention that my proposal would supplement the existing
avenues of immediate discretionary jurisdiction, so litigants would lose no
existing rights of appeal from trial-court decisions that do not raise issues of
pure law. For example, the discretionary decision whether to certify a
class 301—even in an MDL proceeding—would still qualify for
of the other deferential standards of review . . . .”); see also Dalton, supra note 19, at 80
(“[R]eversals are more likely when the question is one of law . . . .”).
299. See, e.g., Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 607 (2009) (recognizing
propriety of certifying discovery-privilege order for immediate appeal under § 1292(b) when
it “involves a new legal question”).
300. Perhaps with the benefit of experience under my current proposal, there would be a
case for expanding the availability of mandatory appellate jurisdiction in MDL cases to
include appeals from certain discretionary rulings. There certainly is extensive criticism in
the literature of the extent to which trial judges enjoy discretion in case management, even
outside the MDL context. See, e.g., Gensler, supra note 126, at 720–26 (discussing academic
critiques of trial-court discretion).
301. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 630 (1997) (Breyer, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (district courts have “‘broad power and
discretion . . . with respect to matters involving the certification’ of class actions” (quoting
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 345 (1979))).
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discretionary appellate review under Rule 23(f). Mandamus would also
remain an option for other orders on matters committed to the district
court’s discretion, such as discovery orders involving privileged
material. 302
Limiting review to legal issues would insulate both the trial and appellate
courts from excessive appeals, while still providing a right of appellate
review on the questions that make the most difference for the parties and,
ultimately, the evolution of the law. And because there is no room for
serious disagreement about whether an issue is or is not a legal issue, this
element of my proposed test serves as a rule, rather than a standard, and will
presumably enjoy consistent application from court to court and from case
to case.
2. An Unsettled Area of Law or an Order That Disregards Settled Law
The second criterion of my proposal is that the issue of law be novel or
unsettled, or that the district court has declined to follow settled law. This
requirement, similar to the § 1292(b) requirement that there be “substantial
ground for difference of opinion” 303 (and perhaps even more similar to its
analog in bankruptcy304), ensures that the interlocutory appeal actually
merits an appellate court’s immediate attention. But unlike the second
prong under § 1292(b), a mere basis for disagreement is not enough to
trigger appellate jurisdiction; this second criterion would instead require a
would-be appellant to demonstrate that the district court has unilaterally
undertaken to define the law in a new area or has disregarded controlling
precedent. The three decisions in the MTBE litigation described above305
would all fit the bill. This avenue for immediate appeal would be
particularly helpful for federal court pronouncements of state law, where
the comity considerations demand even greater scrutiny 306 and where
immediate appellate review would, in some cases, facilitate certification to
the state’s highest court. 307
Admittedly, this criterion overlaps to some extent with the merits of the
appeal. But that is not a novel problem in appellate jurisdiction. The
analogous provision of § 1292(b) shares that quality, and the likelihood of

302. See Mohawk, 130 S. Ct. at 607 (“[I]n extraordinary circumstances—i.e., when a
disclosure order . . . works a manifest injustice—a party may petition the court of appeals for
a writ of mandamus.”); see also Robertson, supra note 22, at 779–85 (advocating mandamus
when trial court refuses to certify interlocutory appeal from order compelling disclosure of
privileged material).
303. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2006).
304. See id. § 158(d)(2)(A)(i) (“[Q]uestion of law as to which there is no controlling
decision of the court of appeals for the circuit or of the Supreme Court of the United States,
or involves a matter of public importance . . . .”).
305. See supra Part II.B.3.a.
306. See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
307. See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
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error has also been suggested as an appropriate factor in determining
whether to hear discretionary appeals under Rule 23(f). 308
Of course, reasonable jurists can disagree about the extent to which a
district court’s articulation of the law has truly departed from established
precedent. In that respect, this element of my proposed test has the
potential to dissolve into a discretionary standard,309 as opposed to a
mandatory rule. Such disagreements are not ideal, but they are also
inevitable in any test for mandatory appellate jurisdiction.310 They are no
more troubling at the jurisdictional stage than they would be on the merits
in an appeal after a final judgment. Our legal system often grapples with
legal tests that combine fixed rules with flexible standards, 311 and the
imperfection of that blend is less troubling than the absence of appellate
review altogether. And, at bottom, an appellate court that rejects
jurisdiction based on this criterion would implicitly suggest agreement with
the district court’s decision, which alone would provide some measure of
guidance to the litigants.
3. An Issue That Is Potentially Dispositive of a Significant Number of
Cases in the MDL
The third criterion of my proposal is that an immediate appeal have a
potentially dispositive impact on a significant number of the cases
consolidated within the MDL—analogous to the § 1292(b) requirement that
an interlocutory appeal “may materially advance the ultimate termination of
the litigation.” 312 This requirement ensures that the leap from discretionary
to mandatory jurisdiction is justified under the circumstances. Thus, if the
MDL setting is the factor that creates the “serious, perhaps irreparable,
consequence” of deferring appellate review until final judgment, then there
308. See Christopher A. Kitchen, Note, Interlocutory Appeal of Class Action Certification
Decisions Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f): A Proposal for a New Guideline,
2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 231, 233 (“[T]he courts of appeals should each adopt a
guideline” for discretionary review of class-certification orders under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(f) “that allows for appeal when it can be shown that the district court’s
decision is ‘likely erroneous.’”).
309. See Redish, supra note 25, at 101 (suggesting, for discretionary appeals, “a kind of
‘probable cause’ examination of the issue, comparable in some ways to a shorthand certiorari
process, by which the appellate court could satisfy itself without full study of the merits that
the issue on appeal posed a legal question whose answer was either uncertain or likely to
have been incorrectly determined by the district court”).
310. See supra notes 27–30 and accompanying text (discussing difficulties in defining
contours of final-judgment rule).
311. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 13, at 561 (“[L]egal commands mix [rules and
standards] in varying degrees.”).
312. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2006). The Supreme Court recently held that “district courts
should not hesitate to certify” a discovery-privilege ruling for interlocutory appeal if it
“involves a new legal question or is of special consequence.” Mohawk Indus., Inc. v.
Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 607 (2009). Since discovery rulings will rarely advance the
termination of the litigation, we are left to conclude that the Court does not necessarily
require a would-be appellant to meet that prong of the test. My proposed reform, by
contrast, absolutely requires that the order in question have the potential to be dispositive of
a substantial number of cases consolidated within an MDL.
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must be a corresponding requirement that the interlocutory appeal will itself
have MDL-sized impact. 313 It makes no sense to depart from the strictures
of the final-judgment rule unless the departure actually addresses the
problem we are trying to solve.
Implementing this criterion presents no special challenges, but it is
admittedly the prong of my test that retains the sort of case-by-case
subjectivity normally seen in discretionary review and more akin to a
standard than a rule. To some extent the case-by-case evaluation is
unavoidable; a requirement in terms of absolute numbers of affected cases
or even the affected percentage of consolidated cases seems too rigid. At
the same time, there must be a check against the appellate courts’
institutional inclination to decline review too frequently. The presumption,
then, should be in favor of interlocutory review. A court should decline
review only when the order in question clearly appears to have a limited
impact on a very small number of the consolidated cases.
As an illustration, this prong of the test would not have deprived the
appellate court of jurisdiction over the district court’s conflict-preemption
decision in the MTBE litigation, because that issue has affected every case
in the MDL. It also would have required appellate review of the district
court’s creation of the commingled-product theory, because that theory has
affected every case governed by the law of the states that the court held
would adopt it. The district court’s questionable jurisdiction over the cases
originally removed to federal court solely on the basis of § 1442(a)(1) is a
closer call, because the issue has affected a smaller subset of the MDL
cases, and reversal would have returned them to state court rather than
aiding in their substantive resolution. 314 But even a denial of interlocutory
review over the jurisdictional question would have been a tolerable result,
because the affected cases would still have benefited from the immediate
appeals that would have gone forward on the other two issues.
B. The Benefits of Mandatory Appeal from Important Interlocutory MDL
Orders Outweigh the Costs
Like all policy choices, creating a new category of mandatory appellate
jurisdiction—and the specific proposal I offer here for doing so—comes
with costs. Policymakers and commentators have debated the trade-offs
between the final-judgment rule and its exceptions for over a century. But
the disadvantages always inherent in expanding appellate jurisdiction are
worth the price in the MDL context. At bottom, the reform I propose would
foster the integrity of the MDL system, which is designed, after all, to
promote judicial efficiency.

313. Cf. Solimine & Hines, supra note 196, at 1582 (noting, in Rule 23(f) context, that
“the presence or absence of simultaneous litigation in other courts” would weigh in favor of
interlocutory review).
314. In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 1:00-1898, MDL
1358 (SAS), M 21-88, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 225, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2005).
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Expanding mandatory appellate jurisdiction is not an insignificant
reform, but it is certainly not without precedent in our relatively recent
history. The Supreme Court, though it struggles to limit the collateral-order
doctrine, created the category in 1949315 and has frequently expanded its
reach. 316 And Congress, to protect arbitration clauses, added a new
category of mandatory appellate jurisdiction in 1988 from orders refusing to
enforce them. 317
There are obviously several costs to my proposal, beginning with the
increased appellate workload that will naturally result. 318 The added
resources required to staff the appellate courts adequately will require
capital outlay. But Congress, in enacting the MDL statute, has already
established a policy that the benefits of coordinated MDL proceedings
justify the costs of staffing the JPML and administering the MDL system; it
is unlikely that the added appellate costs would skew that analysis. And
there will be an offset in the workload of the district courts, in some
instances by resolving cases entirely and in others by preventing district
courts from wasting their resources on activities premised on a
misconception of the law.319
Several commentators have also pointed out that a new category of
appellate jurisdiction would create “satellite procedural litigation” over
appellate jurisdiction in each case.320 While litigation over appellate
jurisdiction is not ideal, it is nothing new. For example, in the collateralorder context, courts must grapple with such amorphous factors as whether
the “interlocutory ruling” in question “concerns an ‘important’ issue.”321
Most avenues of discretionary jurisdiction requires briefing on the threshold
315. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
316. See, e.g., Lloyd C. Anderson, The Collateral Order Doctrine: A New “Serbonian
Bog” and Four Proposals for Reform, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 539, 575–76 (1998) (“[T]he
Court’s periodic willingness to expand the [collateral-order] doctrine . . . created a long list
of new candidates for collateral order appeal.”).
317. See supra note 60 and accompanying text; see also Bergeron, supra note 33, at 1366.
318. See Waters, supra note 9, at 586 (frequent appellate review in mass-tort cases “is
simply not practicable in light of the much-lamented (and much-debated) caseload crisis
already facing the courts of appeals”).
319. See Solimine, supra note 33, at 1178 (“A modest increase in interlocutory appeals,
however, may decrease the overall federal court caseload by expediting and possibly
shortening the resolution of trial court cases and by leading to more settlements at the district
court level.”).
320. See Glynn, supra note 17, at 254 (“[T]he category-based approach has the potential
to produce some collateral litigation over the issue of appealability, specifically, whether the
order in question falls within the category covered by the rule.”); Nagel, supra note 42, at
220 (“Broad categories in mandatory terms would likely lead to substantial amounts of
satellite procedural litigation construing the boundaries of these categories.”); Rosenberg,
supra note 29, at 172 (“Entirely too much of the appellate courts’ energy is absorbed in
deciding whether they are entitled under the finality principle and its exceptions to hear cases
brought before them—and explaining why or why not.”). One commentator dismisses this
concern. See Redish, supra note 25, at 101 (“Since appealability of a district court’s order
can be determined on a motion to dismiss the appeal—at a comparatively early stage in the
appellate process and presumably before a full-blown analysis of the merits need be
conducted by either the litigants or the court—such a preliminary determination could be
made with relative flexibility.”).
321. Steinman, supra note 15, at 1253.
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question whether the appellate courts should accept the case322—and, in the
cases of § 1292(b) and Rule 54(b), whether the trial court should permit
it. 323 Often these petitions for appellate review hinge on amorphous criteria
that vary from court to court. 324 By contrast, the proposed criteria for
interlocutory appellate jurisdiction in MDL cases are fairly straightforward.
Another concern is that “any increase in the scope or amount of appellate
review necessarily results in the reduction of the power and authority of the
district judge.” 325 This dynamic is especially keen when an appeal is
successful, leaving “the reversed trial judge [to] feel that her time and
energy have been wasted, her work unappreciated, and her judgment called
into question.” 326 But this concern merits minimal attention, at least in the
context of my proposed reform. By definition, only those orders reflecting
a district judge’s unilateral conception of what the law is (or should be) will
satisfy the second criterion. We should hope that our district court judges
would appreciate and encourage an opportunity to ensure that these
decisions are correct—especially given the sweeping impact that legal
rulings can have in MDL cases. An MDL judge can even control the timing
by issuing legal decisions at convenient moments in the litigation when an
interlocutory appeal would be least disruptive. Any judge who would take
offense at appellate review in these circumstances needs a check on his own
hubris. 327
Some commentators have also warned that opportunities to appeal
disproportionately benefit the mass-tort defendants, who tend to have
322. See FED. R. APP. P. 5 (governing procedure for petitioning court of appeals for
permission to appeal); see also Nagel, supra note 42, at 219 (“The courts of appeals would
have to review each petition filed, which would require some effort.”); Robertson, supra
note 22, at 774 (“In practice, . . . discretionary review is likely to create nearly as large a
burden on appellate courts as mandatory review; the courts would need to review every
request for review, even those that are subsequently denied.”). But see Martineau, supra note
26, at 777 (noting, but disagreeing with, criticism that discretionary-review system would
“inundate[]” the courts of appeals “with applications for leave to appeal interlocutory orders,
thus increasing rather than decreasing their workloads.”). Professor Martineau suggests that
the adoption of broad discretionary appellate jurisdiction has not overwhelmed Wisconsin’s
appellate courts, but “the data from that system may not predict accurately how many
petitions would be filed if the federal courts adopted a similar regime.” Glynn, supra note
17, at 237; see also Nagel, supra note 42, at 220 (“[T]he [Wisconsin] numbers tell little of
what impact this discretionary scheme would have on the federal system.”).
323. See, e.g., Cnty. of Suffolk v. Amerada Hess Corp. (In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether
(MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig.), Nos. 1:00-1898, MDL 1358 (SAS), M 21-88, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 47222, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2008).
324. See, e.g., supra note 85 (inconsistent criteria in evaluating discretionary appeals
under Rule 23(f)).
325. Redish, supra note 25, at 105 (citing Charles Alan Wright, The Doubtful
Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 751, 780–81 (1957)); see also Nagel,
supra note 42, at 203 (“[P]iecemeal appeals threaten the independence of trial judges.”);
Waters, supra note 9, at 586 (“[E]xcessive appellate oversight of mass tort trial judges would
hinder . . . the ingenuity and creativity of enterprising trial judges.”).
326. Dalton, supra note 19, at 68.
327. See Martha Minow, Judge for the Situation: Judge Jack Weinstein, Creator of
Temporary Administrative Agencies, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2010, 2033 (1997) (“Being a great
judge requires the hubris to do what seems necessary, and perhaps surprisingly, the humility
to admit the limitations of oneself and the materials at hand.”).
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greater financial resources and will use that wherewithal to manipulate the
litigation process 328 and “‘wear out’ a plaintiff with inferior economic
backing.” 329 That concern is mitigated by the growing strength and
resources of the plaintiffs’ bar.330 And, while any expansion of appellate
jurisdiction runs the risk of facilitating gamesmanship and inviting delay,
there are ways to prevent that problem; blocking access to the appellate
courts is not the best of them. If the appellant files a frivolous appeal, the
appellee already has a remedy in the form of “just damages and single or
double costs,” 331 including attorneys’ fees. 332
Additional sanction
provisions could also be added, to level the playing field, if experience
suggests a need to curb abuse. A specific sanction (such as a higher level of
prejudgment interest) could be authorized for frivolous appeals that serve
no purpose other than to engender delay or to exploit a poorer litigant’s lack
of resources.
Finally, there is a valid procedural concern: if a party has a right to an
interlocutory appeal under this MDL proposal but fails to exercise it, does
the right revive when the case reaches final judgment? The Supreme Court
has recently suggested that it does not revive in the collateral-order
context. 333 While collateral orders are final orders that arguably must be
appealed immediately, the MDL orders that would become appealable
under my proposal are, by definition, interlocutory.
Once those
interlocutory orders merge into a final judgment, the right to appeal should
merge with them if it has not already been exercised.334
In sum, there are clearly costs to my proposal, as there are with any
expansion of appellate jurisdiction. But these costs are worth the price of
admission considering the numerous benefits for the parties, for the tort
system, for the evolution of the law, and ultimately for the public’s
confidence in our multi-tiered justice system.

328. Dalton, supra note 19, at 70 (“Party initiative [of appeals] is . . . commonly viewed
as a means of allocating scarce judicial resources on the basis of intensity of felt need as
expressed by willingness to pay to play.”).
329. Redish, supra note 25, at 105.
330. See, e.g., Stephen C. Yeazell, Re-Financing Civil Litigation, 51 DEPAUL L. REV.
183, 198 (2001) (“[A] well-capitalized and specialized plaintiffs’ lawyer may have deeper
resources than does the defense.”).
331. FED. R. APP. P. 38.
332. See, e.g., St. Germain v. Howard, 556 F.3d 261, 264 (5th Cir. 2009) (“The Court
may assess sanctions and single or double costs and attorney’s fees against a party if their
appeal is deemed frivolous.”).
333. See Ortiz v. Jordan, No. 09-737, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 915, at *16 (Jan. 24, 2011)
(noting that time to file an appeal from a collateral order had “expired” by the time of trial,
more than 30 days later).
334. See, e.g., Long v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 589 F.3d 1075, 1078 & n.2 (10th
Cir. 2009) (“[O]nce the district court enters a final order, its earlier interlocutory orders
merge into the final judgment and are reviewable on appeal.”); United States v. 191.07 Acres
of Land, 482 F.3d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Failure to pursue an opportunity for
interlocutory appeal normally does not constitute a waiver.”).
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C. The Best Way To Implement the New Jurisdictional Provision
Until recently, expanding appellate jurisdiction required an act of
Congress. 335 But in the 1990s, Congress vested the Supreme Court with
authority to promulgate rules identifying new categories of both final
judgments 336 and appealable interlocutory orders. 337 It is now within the
province of both Congress, through legislation, and the Supreme Court,
through rulemaking, to expand appellate jurisdiction.
The Court itself has touted the “important virtues” of the rulemaking
process: “It draws on the collective experience of bench and bar, and it
facilitates the adoption of measured, practical solutions.”338 The Court has
also recognized Congress’s role to “weigh the competing interests of the
dockets of the trial and appellate courts, to consider the practicability of
savings in time and expense, and to give proper weight to the effect on
litigants.” 339
The precise vehicle for implementing my proposal is ultimately
immaterial to the substance; the provisions would operate the same way,
whether codified in a statute or promulgated as a rule. I would nevertheless
suggest that the better approach is to amend the MDL statute, § 1407, to
add within it the right of appellate review from orders that meet the three
criteria I have articulated. That location will undoubtedly offend the
commentators who lament the disorganization of our patchwork of
appellate rules.340 But it will highlight an important undercurrent: the
MDL system cries out for a new route of appeal, and it belongs, part and
parcel, with the other MDL statutory provisions. By amending the statute,
we ensure, perhaps poetically, that the law governing MDL procedure
would be consolidated in one place.
CONCLUSION
Our tolerance for the final-judgment rule is limited by our desire to
ameliorate the “substantial, perhaps irreparable, consequence” that it
sometimes creates. Congress and the Supreme Court have extended
mandatory appellate jurisdiction over several categories of interlocutory

335. See Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 610 (2009) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part).
336. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(c) (2006).
337. See id. § 1292(e); see also supra note 67 and accompanying text; Mohawk, 130 S.
Ct. at 609 (describing statutory amendments); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Defining Finality and
Appealability by Court Rule: A Comment on Martineau’s “Right Problem, Wrong
Solution”, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 795, 796 (1993) (same); Solimine & Hines, supra note 196, at
1563–64 (same).
338. Mohawk, 130 S. Ct. at 609 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2073 (2006)); see also Rowe, supra
note 337, at 802 (“The rulemakers, in particular the Advisory Committee on Appellate
Rules, can think about policy and what may be the best ways to define finality and the
circumstances in which interlocutory appeals shall be allowed, and then draft rules to
achieve those ends.”).
339. Balt. Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 181 (1955); see also Martineau,
supra note 26, at 775 (suggesting legislative process may be more efficient).
340. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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orders. The time has come to make another categorical value judgment,
adding certain MDL orders to that list.
The MDL system has become so integral to federal civil litigation that it
seems hard to imagine a time that we lived without it. Consolidating cases
with common factual and legal questions provides a tremendous savings to
our courts and to the parties. It also facilitates global settlement.
But the bewitching virtues of the MDL system should not blind us to the
ways in which it undermines some of the basic principles of American
jurisprudence—that everyone deserves a day in court, that federal courts
respect the limits of the state laws they interpret, and that no one judge
should hold outsized power. Eventually, the virtues of efficiency reach
their limit. Our quest for efficiency runs up against our disdain for
centralized power.
We can solve the problem. Through mandatory appellate jurisdiction, we
can permit appellate courts to review interlocutory MDL orders, and
momentarily decentralize MDL proceedings, when MDL judges make legal
rulings that potentially overstep the law. Doing so restores balance to the
proceedings, enables the parties to make informed choices about settlement
and business practices, and results in a more fully developed body of
emerging law. We need mandatory jurisdiction, rather than discretionary
jurisdiction, because the orders in question—like the other routes to
mandatory appellate review—fall into a definable category, and because
experience teaches that courts are parsimonious in permitting discretionary
review. In the end, the importance of legal rulings in MDL cases demands
that appellate review be a component of the system; it should not depend on
the acquiescence of the MDL judge or the whims of a random three-judge
panel.
To be sure, it is costly to interrupt an MDL proceeding while a case
proceeds to appeal. But on balance, the costs are more palatable than the
existing infirmities of an MDL system in which appellate review is largely
unavailable. A right of interlocutory appeal would ensure the integrity of
the MDL system. And we need to protect that integrity, because the mass
tort shows no signs of an imminent demise.

